Author: Georgi Lozanov
Mr. Popov, your book on the sociology of risk is being published by "Bloomsbury" publishing house these days. What are the main theses in it? Where does the potential of the concept "risk" for its own research field come from?
St. Popov: Risk is a dominant form in which modern developed and rationally structured societies view their future. My book presents a sociology of risk, from the experience of risk to working with risks. A major part of it is devoted to clarifying the concept of risk itself and those related to it. I attach great importance to distinguishing risk from uncertainty, danger and threat, which usual political discourse confuses. Risk is the probability of an adverse event related to human activity. We think in the perspective of risks when we identify, analyze, evaluate and manage them. Thus, risk thinking is a fairly high degree of rational attitude to public affairs. Whether a meteor will destroy the Earth or humanity will disappear one day is not a risk. Russia is not a risk, but a direct threat. The corruption risk in Bulgaria is not a risk, it is not managed, but gradually became a way of public communication. Beyond this sad finding in Bulgaria (although it is not touched upon in the book) risks are not managed, the government waits and reacts panicked - as we see with the floods, for example. This is a sure sign that institutions are generally in poor condition and do not function. By definition, institutions are structures for risk management, this point lies in their very design.
I ask you to comment on the possible political and geopolitical risks facing Bulgarian society today in an attached plan of your theory. What is the risk, for example, that joining the eurozone will increase Euroscepticism?
St. Popov: Euroscepticism is a mood, quite irrational. It cannot be managed, so it is better to talk about a danger. Accession is already a given, it is underway, and I think this danger is overestimated. The stages of accession are degrees of higher integration. They provide more security and increase control over the local political class. And it needs higher control, since for the most part it is deeply corrupt.
Is the risk high that the debt spiral will lead the country to a Greek variant?
St. Popov: Low to moderate at the moment. But it is a risk in the narrow sense of the word, not a danger, uncertainty, threat, chance, etc. The country's government is fully conscious of passing budgets with an expenditure part that exceeds in percentage terms everything permissible since the great financial crisis in 1996. There is no reason to do this, except for the intention to absorb significant amounts through prepared channels.
What is the risk that "Lukoil" will follow the fate of "Bulgartabac" and Corpbank?
St. Popov: Nil in the current conditions. First, "Lukoil" is a multinational public company with shares on world stock exchanges. International legislation is valid for it and "Litasko", the parent company, can dispose of it. Second, "Lukoil" is selling its assets in their entirety, and the four Bulgarian companies (mainly "Neftohim") are only part of "Lukoil"'s assets in Europe. We do not know whether in the future "Lukoil" would sell parts of the company, but for now, no. Thirdly, while the US sanctions are in force, "Lukoil" will have to conclude a deal with a company that will not fall under sanctions. This means that the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the US Treasury Department has the final say (if a future buyer falls under sanctions, he will not be able to sell his petroleum products). Fourthly, in order to repeat the case with "Bulgartabac" and CorpBank, Bulgaria must first nationalize the Bulgarian companies of "Lukoil" and then undertake the well-known corruption operation. No one can afford this. In short, while CorpBank and "Bulgartabac" were entirely Bulgarian hoaxes, with "Lukoil" a similar scenario is very unlikely.
What is the risk of Radev winning parliamentary elections with a Eurosceptic party?
St. Popov: And this is not exactly a risk, more of a probability, a chance. For his supporters, this is a good chance. I don't think he will win. He has a chance to get a lot of votes if we project the current moment towards future elections. And he will rather remain isolated. In general, former presidents fantasize about their political future more, but when their mandate ends, their chances drop. We can talk about risk from the perspective of those forces that can stop him. For example, the majority can now call for elections before his mandate expires. But that would also be too much.
Is there a risk that Peevski and/or Borisov will turn out to be conduits for Russian interests?
St. Popov: They do not have a principled, sustainable orientation and direction. These are opportunistic agents who play with power and money. And yet for Borisov it is less likely, because the GERB party will hardly submit to an open pro-Russian turn. For Peevski, what is profitable for Peevski at a given moment will become. He is not exactly a politician, as Borisov is anyway. Peevski works only with money.
Is there a risk of a pro-Putin government coming to Bulgaria?
St. Popov: An openly pro-Putin government will explode the country, society will not swallow such degradation. Of course, a coalition can be formed, ready to make concessions to Putin's Russia, similar to Hungary and the Czech Republic. In Bulgaria after 2001, all governments have had soft, flexible, opportunistic pro-Russian attitudes. They are patient with them, which is why the openly pro-Russian "Vazrazhdane" gets 12-15 percent. But I don't think a more radical option is likely.
Is there a serious risk that the democratic opposition (PP/DB) will drop out of active politics?
St. Popov: This is a risk in a direct sense, because it depends on the parties of democratic representation, they must manage such a risk. But no, there won't be. Even if these structures in this form go bankrupt, the more emancipated, critical and highly urbanized public areas will emit an alternative, as happened after 1989.
Is there a risk that Bulgaria will leave NATO and the EU?
St. Popov: No. More precisely, negligible. The world must be completely turned upside down.
Is the risk of Russia attacking Bulgaria big or small?
St. Popov: Russia is a threat to all its neighbors and even to their neighbors and the neighbors of their neighbors. It is a threat, i.e. a risk that has a specific carrier, a subject. A threat is confronted with the security paradigm characteristic of the Cold War. It was conceptually built after 1945, mainly by George Kennan. The ideas of deterrence and containment occupy a central place in it. We often say that Russia is pursuing an imperial policy, this has already become a cliché. But it says something quite true and accurate. Russia has not crossed the epochal border from empire to nation-state, in its mentality it has not. As a result, it does not have an internally developed and cultivated sense of borders. Hence the innate tendency to jump over them, to move forward and beyond its established boundaries. This is a deeply archaic political form, a rare exception today. Bulgaria is almost unlikely to be attacked, because Russia's expansion - if not restrained and deterred - would be directed first towards the Baltic republics, then towards Poland, Finland. But a second front for Russia is more than an imperial fantasy, it would accelerate its inevitable disintegration.
Is there a risk of Russia conquering Ukraine?
St. Popov: No, its attempt to conquer Ukraine was stopped, although Russia persists. Russia is a threat, it is essentially, immanently a threat. This is now, with great delay, understood by all of Europe.
But still, Trump's representatives are negotiating directly with the Kremlin and are even trying to impose, as we learn, a 28-point peace plan with major concessions on the part of Ukraine.
St. Popov: What is known about this plan is scandalous and will not be accepted by either Ukraine or its allies in Europe. There is talk of reducing the Ukrainian army to unacceptable levels, ceding all of Donetsk, disarmament, and what not. But this play has been repeated several times and there is no reason to believe that the EU countries will swallow it. They learned how to behave more firmly, albeit diplomatically, with Trump and manage the risk of such absurd proposals, close to the capitulation of Ukraine.
What is the risk of the EU disintegrating?
St. Popov: This is a risk in the narrow sense, not uncertainty, danger or any other category of this kind. To date, it is low, mainly - and somewhat paradoxically - due to Russian aggression. The risk of disintegration was increased over the past decade, because the EU has accelerated bureaucratization and forgotten that its beginning was a concern for peace, a reduction in the risks of another major war. Today, due to the war in Ukraine, the EU has begun to awaken slowly and painfully. The presence of a clear looming threat restructures attitudes in the political center of the EU. This will be healing and consolidating. The EU is beginning to realize that there are more important things than the welfare state and identity politics.
What are the risks of liberal democracy in Europe being replaced by autocracy?
St. Popov: Insofar as these are social processes beyond any specific policies, unmanageable, we can rather talk about dangers associated with social macro-processes. In Europe as a whole, such a development is unlikely. But here a clarification is necessary. The media speaks very inaccurately about liberal democracy. It has two dimensions: the liberal principle is related to rights and freedoms, the democratic one - to the rule of the majority. These two sides are organically connected in the modern constitutional state. At some point, the balance may be disturbed, especially in favor of a dictatorship of the majority. But Western societies have a stable constitutional tradition and the balance is restored. In Europe, there are almost no exceptions to this form of modern political organization, but this is also the case in countries in East Asia. There are other cultures in which the constitutional state and its two principles are unknown. We must accept that this type of diversity is present, there is no way to reform it.
What are the risks of the US leaving NATO?
St. Popov: Let us note that the US leaving NATO can only happen with a legislative act of Congress. Beyond that, NATO is a defensive alliance that has been experiencing uncertainty since the end of the Cold War, not to mention a crisis of mission and goals. The transformation of the Alliance into a security organization is not very convincing, in principle it is not, and not in a given specific case. However, Russian aggression shows that collective defense did not remain at all before 1989. It will concern the USA, yes, there is a risk that a president like Trump will delegitimize and weaken the Alliance without the USA formally leaving it. And this is also a risk in the narrow sense - a development that can be analyzed, assessed and managed. The reduction of this risk is to a large extent in the hands of the EU and especially the large European countries - Germany, France, Italy, the Nordic countries. They must pursue policies that will free the European continent from the tutelage of the US, and from there the US itself will find NATO a modern and attractive organization for itself. I think that will happen, despite the current difficult moment. But there are many positive things for Europe in Trump's unpredictability and arbitrariness. Ultimately, the US is not beholden to Europe in any way - this is the essential right side in Trump's policies and his threats. And hence the need to manage this very risk.
What is the risk that Trump, Putin and Xi Jinping will divide the world into zones of influence among themselves?
St. Popov: These are not three equal states and societies. Russia is dangerous, but it is weak. It is like a robber in the forest - dangerous, capable of causing great mischief, but marginal, frail, weak, perhaps also oppressed and seriously stressed. China and the USA are the major political bodies between which the field of the main lines of force in the world unfolds. They influence everything. Russia is outside this equation and has no chance of returning after this absurd war.
As for this configuration in terms of risks, the risk is mainly for Europe, not for China and the USA, of course. Europe, both as individual countries and as the EU, is lagging behind in a number of strategic areas. First of all, in ignoring its autonomous defense. Second, and perhaps first of all, in innovation, entrepreneurship, and the economy. The USA has a company like NVIDIA, which in terms of market capitalization is equal to Germany's GDP multiplied by 1.5. The entire German economy is worth (if we imagine that it is sold as a commodity) as much as the first 5-7 companies in the USA. This means that on the way to their cherished social state, Europe and the EU have lost the energies for self-defense, but also for innovation, entrepreneurship, and hence the dynamics of their development. This is a mega risk and it is not certain that it can be managed well, although it is understood, analyzed and assessed precisely as a high long-term risk.
Stefan Popov is a professor of philosophy and social sciences at the New Bulgarian University, a doctorate from the New School for Social Research, New York, a doctorate from Sofia University, director of the RiskMonitor research center, a political analyst.