In 2025, Syria once again emerged at the center of the Middle East's strategic equation, but in a radically different form from the one the international community had become accustomed to over the past quarter century.
The collapse of the order established by the Assad regime, the disintegration of the regional networks that supported it, and the rapid realignment of external players have transformed the Levant into a mobile space undergoing a profound transition - one that is changing not only regional balances but also the parameters of global security. This is what researcher Corneliu Pivariu writes in an analysis for the International Institute for Middle East and Balkan Studies (IFIMES).
Syria is no longer the epicenter of a "frozen" conflict, but rather a key element in a broader strategy through which Washington seeks to rebalance the Middle East amid its gradual withdrawal from the role of direct guarantor of regional order.
Three recent developments have accelerated this paradigm shift. The first is the end of the Gaza confrontation - a moment that reshaped the regional balance of power and decisively weakened Iran's influence in the Levant by destroying a significant part of Hezbollah's military infrastructure and eliminating the operational Iranian logistics corridor through Syria - a key supply mechanism and strategic projection.
The second development is the visit of Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to Washington - the first official visit by a Syrian head of state to the United States since Syria declared independence after the end of the French mandate. It clearly signals the orientation of the new Syrian leadership towards international legitimacy by distancing itself from Tehran and realigning itself towards Washington and Ankara.
The third major change, with a direct impact on the situation in Syria, is the visit of Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States - a visit that marked the re-anchoring of Riyadh in its strategic relations with Washington after years of ambiguity, bilateral tension and attempts to balance against China.
Saudi Arabia is once again assuming its role as a key factor in the security architecture of the Middle East and, indirectly, as the main Arab guarantor for the reintegration of Syria after Assad. In the post-Gaza context and against the backdrop of Damascus’s realignment, Saudi Arabia’s return to the American strategic orbit consolidates the emerging regional framework, limits Iran’s room for maneuver, and balances Turkey’s growing influence in northern Syria.
This geopolitical shift reflects a pragmatic strategic logic: if the United States aims to reduce its direct military presence, it must build a regional system of shared responsibility in which local actors shoulder some of the burden for stability and security.
From this perspective, a stabilized and reoriented Syria—integrated into a framework of cooperation with Turkey, Israel, and Arab states—becomes a key element in preventing Iran’s return, reducing the need for a direct American presence, and facilitating the formation of an autonomous regional architecture.
In parallel with this external realignment, Syria faces serious internal structural fragility. The collapse of the Assad regime did not lead to a sustainable institutional transition, but rather created a power vacuum, managed through an arrangement dependent on Ankara.
This reality reflects the inability of the Syrian state to function independently after more than four decades of personalized rule and deep dependence on Iranian military, financial, and ideological support. Iran’s strategic weakening after Gaza, exacerbated by growing international isolation, has left Syria without its main external pillar of support and forced it to seek alternatives.
Thus, in 2025, Syria finds itself in a dynamic process of accelerated realignment – between the need for external legitimacy, pressure from Turkey, Washington’s expectations, and the constraints imposed by Israel – all against the backdrop of a collapsed economy, an exhausted population, and a political elite that is only just taking shape after the disappearance of the old model.
In this context, Russia’s influence has declined sharply. Unlike the period 2014-2018, when Moscow could project power, control Syrian airspace, and defend the Assad regime, in 2025 Russia is a militarily weakened, internationally isolated, and financially squeezed actor, preoccupied primarily with its own front in Ukraine. Its role has shrunk to a secondary—almost symbolic—role, and its ability to shape Syria’s trajectory has diminished as its global position has deteriorated.
Meanwhile, Iran is suffering its worst strategic setback in two decades, having lost its operational leverage in Syria and the key links supporting Hezbollah. The elimination of the land corridor between Tehran and the Mediterranean, the destruction of missile depots in Lebanon, the weakening of the capabilities of the "Al-Quds" force, and regional isolation have dismantled what was once the "axis of resistance." The new Syrian leadership neither seeks nor is able to return to such a configuration.
In contrast, Israel is entering a phase of realigned power, with priorities focused on two goals: preventing the return of Iran to Syria and managing the risks associated with the rise of Turkey as the dominant actor in northern Syria. The emergence of a Sunni Syrian regime supported by Turkey is not a comfortable scenario for Tel Aviv, but it is significantly more acceptable than the Iranian one. Israel is therefore seeking a pragmatic understanding with Ankara and Washington, aimed at providing a minimum framework for stability and preventing the military buildup of potentially hostile groups.
In sum, Syria in 2025 is becoming a testing ground for a strategic experiment: can a former clientelistic dictatorship, devastated by a decade of war, be integrated into a new regional architecture that allows the United States to gradually withdraw without creating a new security vacuum?
This is the central question guiding the calculations of regional and global actors:
Turkey sees Syria as the main stage for its neo-Ottoman project;
The United States is seeking a workable model for sharing responsibility;
Israel seeks a non-Iranian buffer zone;
Arab states want Syria to be reintegrated into a predictable order;
Russia and Iran are trying - each in their own way - to limit their losses.
Syria is therefore no longer just a crisis file - it is a geopolitical key to understanding the future order in the Middle East.
Identity, religion, legitimacy and the collapse of the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis
The reconstruction of Syria after Assad cannot be understood without an analysis of the new equation of identity and religion that is beginning to take shape with the gradual collapse of the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah axis - the structure that has sustained Iranian influence in the Levant for more than two decades. For years, the Assad regime relied on three external pillars: Iranian military and financial support, Hezbollah's capabilities and the political-military umbrella provided by Russia. In just a few years, all of these pillars have been seriously weakened, with Iran bearing the brunt of the blow – with profound structural implications for Syria’s future.
The Gaza confrontation accelerated this transformation. The dismantling of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure – the destruction of missile depots, the loss of its leader and many senior and operational personnel, and the disruption of logistical flows – transformed the organization from an offensive to a defensive actor focused on its survival. This development has decisively limited Tehran’s ability to project strategic influence towards the Mediterranean and directly affected its leverage in Syria.
At the same time, Syria is experiencing a subtle but profound shift in its domestic legitimacy. After five decades of political and institutional dominance by the Alawite minority, the new geopolitical and demographic environment favors the rise of a pragmatic Sunni model – less ideological and oriented towards stability, regional reintegration, and international recognition. A consensus is gradually emerging within Syrian elites: the survival of the state requires a "reboot" of identity, in which sectarianism can no longer serve as the exclusive basis of power.
The new confessional balance does not mean the marginalization of minorities, but rather a return to the natural structure of Syrian society, in which the Sunni community represents nearly two-thirds of the population. The emerging model is one of pragmatic governance aimed at consensus and stability, in which religion reduces its role as an instrument of domination and acquires the function of a communal identity governed through coexistence.
This shift in legitimacy has led to the emergence of new aspirational groups in Syria: Sunni economic elites from Aleppo and Hama, moderate administrative cadres from Damascus, and technocrats marginalized over the past two decades. Together, they form the core of a new political class interested in reintegrating Syria into the Arab system and rebalancing its relations with Turkey, the Arab states, and the United States.
In summary, this axis reveals the fundamental elements of Syria’s transformation: the collapse of the Iranian model of control, the rise of a moderate Sunni political identity, and the emergence of an elite that seeks integration into the regional order, rather than resistance to it.
The military-strategic dimension of Syria after the collapse of the Assad system
If identity and legitimacy outline the symbolic framework of change, the military dimension is the arena in which the transformation manifests itself most directly. Post-Assad Syria is a country where the traditional army has been effectively dismantled, and its positions have been filled by external actors with different and often conflicting agendas.
The first key element is Iran’s retreat. For the first time since 2013, Tehran no longer has the operational capacity to maintain a military infrastructure in Syria. The Iraq-Syria-Lebanon logistics network has been largely neutralized, the "Al-Quds" force no longer enjoys freedom of movement, and pro-Iranian militias have lost their cohesion. Without a strong Syrian ally and an effective network of proxy structures, Iran has become a marginal player.
Russia, for its part, has sharply reduced its military presence. The "Hmeimim" airbase functions more as a relic of a bygone era than as a real center of power. The situation is similar with the naval base in Tartus. There are no resources for large-scale operations, and Moscow’s influence on internal processes is minimal. Syria is no longer a major strategic theater for Russia, but a secondary dossier managed with limited resources.
In this vacuum, Turkey has become the de facto main military actor in northern and northwestern Syria. Ankara controls key territories, manages local militias, oversees security infrastructure, and supports the reorganization of Syrian forces loyal to the al-Sharaa regime. Its regional ambitions make Turkey an informal architect of the new security order in northern Syria, making its role indispensable in the current strategic environment.
In parallel, Israel has acquired broad operational freedom in southern Syria, which it uses not only to prevent the reconstruction of Iranian infrastructure and maintain a strategic buffer zone, but also to indirectly influence internal processes in the country. By selectively supporting certain local communities - especially among parts of the Druze in the Jabal al-Druze and in areas close to the border - Israel seeks to put pressure on the Iranian presence and on the regime's ability to control the south. This type of projection of influence, tacitly tolerated by Washington and Ankara, represents one of the key strategic evolutions in the Levant, as it combines freedom of military action with tools for political and social modeling at the local level.
The United States is finally implementing a strategy of "outsourcing order" in Syria. The stabilization of the country is delegated to a network of local actors - Turkey, Israel, and Arab states - each with a complementary role. Washington is not aiming for a military comeback, but for Syria to become a laboratory for a new security model based on real responsibility sharing.
This direction shows that Syria is no longer a chaotic battlefield, but a strategic space in which regional actors exercise differentiated influence and intertwined interests.
Economic recovery: between systemic destruction and competition from external actors
The Syrian economy is entering the post-conflict phase in a state of structural collapse. After fourteen years of war, over 40% of the urban and industrial infrastructure has been destroyed, energy and transport networks are partially functioning, and total economic losses are estimated at $325-400 billion. The Syrian currency has lost 99% of its value. Agriculture - once a major source of export before 2011 - is in dramatic decline, with uncultivable land, destroyed irrigation systems and a significantly reduced workforce due to mass migration. The chemical, textile and pharmaceutical industries, once competitive, have been reduced to fragmented enclaves controlled by different local actors.
In this context, Syria's reconstruction is not just a financial process, but a strategic arena in which regional and global interests collide. Iran, Russia, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates and - in certain sectors - China are seeking preferential access to infrastructure projects, energy, ports, railway networks and urban reconstruction. However, many of the plans drawn up between 2017 and 2021 are outdated due to territorial changes or internal political instability. Damascus, facing heavy international sanctions and a weakened administration, lacks the capacity to coordinate a coherent national reconstruction program.
Realistic assessments indicate that the reconstruction process will require at least 15-20 years and will only begin after political and security stabilization is achieved - conditions that are still uncertain. In the absence of a broad international agreement and a functioning institutional framework, Syria risks a model of "fragmented reconstruction", in which each external actor invests only in the areas under its control or influence. This would perpetuate the country's economic fragmentation and turn reconstruction into a long-term geopolitical tool.
The Regional Balance: The US, Turkey, Israel, Iran, and Saudi Arabia in the Game of Reshaping Syria
This axis concentrates the essence of the strategic dilemma in 2025: how can Syria become a fulcrum of a new regional order when the ambitions of the actors involved diverge and their interests only partially overlap?
For the United States, Syria is a testing ground for a new paradigm: if a devastated country can be reintegrated through coordinated regional efforts, the American withdrawal can proceed without the risk of creating a new vacuum. The Syrian president’s visit to Washington symbolizes this turn and Syria’s re-entry into the Western orbit.
For Turkey, Syria is the core of its geopolitical project. Ankara is not seeking complete control, but structural influence: the reorganization of security policies, support for Sunni networks, and the retention of key positions in the north allow it to shape Syria’s political and military architecture.
Israel views Syria as a space of controlled risk. While a Sunni state supported by Turkey raises questions about long-term stability, it is preferable to an Iranian-dominated model. Israel is therefore pursuing a strategy of minimal stabilization without political or military dependence.
Iran is the big loser. Economically weakened, internally challenged, and lacking the ability to project power into Syria and Lebanon, Tehran no longer possesses key instruments of influence in the Levant.
Saudi Arabia, supported by Pakistan, seeks to balance Turkey’s growing influence—not through military means, but through economic resources and Arab legitimacy, which are essential to the reconstruction process.
This direction shows that Syria is not simply an intersection of competing interests, but the pillar on which an emerging new regional order is being tested.
Strategic conclusion: Syria as the axis of the new regional order
In a surprisingly short period, Syria has transformed from a failed state manipulated by external forces into a key element of a regional strategy aimed at reshaping the balance of power in the Middle East. This transformation does not stem from internal reforms, but from the convergence of three dynamics: the weakening of Iran and Russia, the pragmatic realignment of the new Syrian leadership, and the shift in the American security paradigm towards "outsourcing order".
For Washington, the success of integrating Syria into a regional system of cooperation - led by Turkey and guaranteed by Israel and the Arab states - represents the decisive test for a new model of controlled withdrawal.
For Turkey, Syria is the center of its regional ambitions.
For Israel, a space of manageable risk.
For Saudi Arabia, a field for balancing.
For Iran and Russia, an almost irretrievably lost file.
For Syria itself, this is a rare opportunity to transform the external context into minimal internal stabilization and gradual reintegration into the regional order.
In this sense, Syria is becoming not just a foreign policy dossier, but an indicator of the future regional order in the Middle East - a test of the ability of local and global actors to maintain stability in an international system in the process of profound transformation.