Jihadist fighters in Mali have called for a national uprising against the ruling military junta, tightening the blockade of the capital Bamako after coordinated attacks with Tuareg separatists. This is what Gregory Sauvage writes for "France 24".
The call comes from the Group in Support of Islam and Muslims (JNIM), an al-Qaeda affiliate. It is the result of a series of joint offensives that have hit multiple cities and military positions across the country and reached Bamako, the capital, marking the most serious escalation in Mali since 2012.
In a statement, JNIM called for a "common front" uniting "political parties, the national armed forces, religious authorities, traditional leaders and all components of Malian society" to "overthrow the junta" and pave the way for what it described as a "peaceful and inclusive transition".
The events come as Mali holds the funeral of Defense Minister Sadio Camara, who was killed in an attack on his residence in Kati, a junta stronghold about 20 kilometers from the capital. A key architect of closer ties between Bamako and Russia, Camara was considered one of the regime’s most influential figures. His death has increased pressure on the military junta led by Assimi Goyta, despite renewed support from Moscow.
A Union of Convenience
The offensive is based on an unexpected partnership between the JNIM and the Front for the Liberation of Azawad (FLA), a Tuareg movement that has recaptured Kidal, a long-contested stronghold in the north.
The scale and coordination of the attacks suggest months of preparation. Analysts say the alliance is driven by pragmatism. The FLA brings local legitimacy and territorial roots, while the JNIM provides the firepower and operational expertise needed to challenge the state. "The coordination between these groups suggests months of planning," said Nina Willen, director of the Africa Program at the Egmont Institute. "This goes much further than what we have seen in the past."
For Wassim Nasr, FRANCE 24's expert on jihadist networks, the change is particularly significant. "They are no longer just fighting side by side. They are acting together," he points out.
A common enemy, different goals
Despite their cooperation on the battlefield, the alliance remains fragile. The two movements are divided by fundamentally different goals. JNIM seeks to impose a strict interpretation of Islamic law in Mali and the wider Sahel. The FLA, by contrast, seeks independence - or at least autonomy - for the Tuareg in the north. "They have a common enemy, but not a common project," notes Nina Willen.
The divide is as much political as it is ideological. "There are big differences," said Djenabou Cisse, a defense specialist at the French think tank, the "Foundation for Strategic Studies." "The JNIM is driven by a religious project, while the FLA seeks self-determination. One is multinational and multi-ethnic; the other is rooted in a specific people."
These differences are already visible. After taking Kidal, Tuareg separatists have signaled plans to expand their control into northern Mali. The Malian army and its Russian mercenary allies have surrendered Camp Tessalit, a strategic northern military stronghold, to armed rebels. An FLA official told AFP that troops and mercenaries at the "supercamp" "they have just surrendered, as they did in Kidal", referring to a key northern city captured last weekend.
Meanwhile, the JNIM is focusing on isolating the capital, reviving a strategy aimed at weakening the authorities by choking off supply routes and fueling public discontent. According to Vincent Hugo, a journalist and lecturer at Sciences Po, such tactics are designed not so much to seize power outright as to undermine it. "In reality, both the rebels and the Islamists know that they lack the resources - both in terms of manpower and equipment - to hold a capital like Bamako in the long term." JNIM's long-term goal may be to shape the political landscape by encouraging the emergence of a regime more aligned with its demands, he stressed.
Echoes of past alliances
The current alliance between jihadist fighters and Tuareg separatists is reminiscent of events in the early 2010s, when similar, short-lived collaborations between rebel and Islamist groups were seen in northern Mali.
At that time, Tuareg separatists from the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) joined forces with Islamist factions, including Ansar Dine, until they seized control of much of the north. Their advance on Bamako prompted France to intervene in 2013 with Operation Serval, halting the offensive and restoring state control to key areas.
There are also long-standing personal ties between the two camps. Iyad Ag Ghali, the current head of the JNIM, was once a leading figure in the Tuareg rebellion. However, cooperation has historically been tempered by rivalry, particularly over territory and resources in northern and central Mali.
The Unstable Outlook
The Tuareg, a historically nomadic people spread across Mali, Niger, Algeria, Libya and Burkina Faso, have long complained of marginalization. Their goal remains the creation of an independent Azawad in northern Mali. In contrast, JNIM continues to expand its reach in the Sahel and is embroiled in a fierce rivalry with the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara.
As regional dynamics evolve, the situation on the ground remains precarious. Roads to Bamako have been increasingly cut off after JNIM earlier announced its intention to impose a blockade, increasing pressure on the capital and raising fears of a prolonged siege.
According to a JNIM spokesman, civilians in the city are still being allowed to leave.