Russia is losing on the battlefield - and on the world stage, as the US and China distance themselves from the war. This is written in an article for the online publication The Conversation by Mark Edele, professor of history at the University of Melbourne.
Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine is often and misleadingly characterized as a conflict of great powers. The prevailing narrative is that Russia started a war against Ukraine because it felt threatened by NATO's expansion into Eastern Europe after 1991. The real enemy is the United States, which is at least "primarily responsible" for the war.
This interpretation follows the Kremlin's theses. It takes the logic of the Cold War and transfers it to a fundamentally different modern world. It has been refuted by both political scientists and historians.
In reality, Russia’s war is the exact opposite of a great-power conflict. It is a confrontation between middle powers. The great powers—the United States and China—are acting on the sidelines.
Russia is no longer a great power
Russia ceased to be a great power after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989-1991. As Edele notes in his book "Russia’s War Against Ukraine", Russia is a middle power with a great-power complex.
It has successfully usurped the legacy of the Soviet great powers, including its permanent seat on the UN Security Council and one of the world’s largest nuclear arsenals. She has also projected a vision of herself as a world leader, which has won her some support among conservatives in the global North and critics of US hegemony in the global South.
But she can no longer prove these claims. Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) is only slightly larger than that of South Korea and smaller than that of Canada or Brazil.
Russia still has one of the largest armies in the world, with approximately 1.1 million active duty personnel. But to maintain it, it would have to allocate 7.5% of its economy – or $190 billion – to military spending by 2025.
Meanwhile, the often-criticized underspending of European NATO members, none of which spends more than 4.5% of GDP, amounts to nearly three times that: $559 billion.
Russian President Vladimir Putin has launched a war to reverse this reality and make Russia great again. But the Russian army has failed to defeat the Ukrainian army in the war, even though Kiev has only 880,000 active-duty soldiers.
Four and a half years after a full-scale invasion, Russia has suffered a functional defeat in Ukraine. About 80% of Ukraine remains in Ukrainian hands behind a largely static front line. Moscow’s activity has now been reduced to conducting airstrikes against civilians, a criminal strategy of desperation with few historical examples of success.
Its international influence is also declining. Since 2022, Russia has lost carefully selected allies in Syria, Venezuela, and Hungary. Europe, once a lucrative market for Russian hydrocarbons, has become a long-term hostile environment.
Meanwhile, Ukraine has risen from a minor power on the fringes of Europe to a diplomatic and military middle power in the heart of the continent.
While still financially dependent on Europe, it is now a world leader in drone production. The recent "drone diplomacy" President Volodymyr Zelensky’s Middle East policy — which culminated in a decade-long agreement with three countries — further demonstrates how one country can do much better than expected.
Ukraine is also playing a central role in Europe’s continued reassertion — and this week took a major step toward joining the European Union.
Why have the great powers distanced themselves?
This war is a war between middle powers, not an indirect conflict between great powers. It cannot be interpreted as some grand game about "Eurasia".
Neither China nor the United States wanted a war in Europe this century. China remains focused on Taiwan as the United States grapples with the fallout from its disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan and its concerns about China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific. During the escalating crisis caused by Russia in the second half of 2021, the Biden administration sought to de-escalate tensions, create diplomatic opportunities, and thwart Russian war plans by making them public.
After the full-scale invasion in early 2022, China and the United States remained wary of turning Putin’s war into a great-power conflict.
China has taken advantage of Russia’s extremely cheap energy supplies and markets abandoned by European and American companies. It has become the “decisive player” in Russia’s war, hoping to divert US attention from Asia.
But Beijing has been careful not to supply weapons to Russia. It has also publicly opposed nuclear escalation and reaffirmed its support for the “sovereignty and territorial integrity” of all parties involved.
More importantly, China has never imposed sanctions on Ukraine, which relies on Chinese components and materials for its rapidly growing drone industry.
Meanwhile, the United States has been hesitant to support Ukraine.
U.S. intelligence initially predicted that Russia would win the war within days. As Ukraine survived, largely on its own arsenals, the Biden administration began to support it, albeit with reservations. The weapons it sent came with conditions, and deliveries were often delayed for fear of crossing some Russian "red line".
This war was even more uncomfortable for the United States than for China. This feeling has only intensified under the Trump administration. As the United States gradually withdrew, a loose coalition of democratic middle powers has stepped up to help Ukraine.
In Ukraine, we are thus witnessing the restructuring of the global system—from the post-1991 US-dominated world order to a multipolar one. In this world, middle powers play a much larger role than they did during the Cold War or in its immediate aftermath.
The leaders of middle powers like Australia and Canada are gradually coming to terms with this new reality.
In contrast, US President Donald Trump has not yet. Even if he were to turn his attention to this war now, he would find that he has far fewer trump cards than he had imagined.