I will present two hypothetical scenarios for the upcoming presidential elections with four main candidates: Iliana Yotova, Andrey Gyurov, Daniel Valchev and Kostadin Kostadinov.
This is not a sociological forecast, but an interpretative model based on the activity of the last presidential elections, the results of the parliamentary vote and the presumed ability of the candidates to mobilize support beyond the narrow party cores.
This was commented on "Facebook" by political psychology professor Ivan Ivanov.
In presidential elections in Bulgaria, approximately 3.2 to 3.5 million people usually vote. With four main recognizable candidates, a victory in the first round seems practically impossible.
Historical experience is also indicative. In all direct presidential elections so far, there has been a runoff. Even more importantly, the candidate who ranked first in the first round always subsequently won the presidency.
This is not a political law and does not guarantee the future result. However, it indicates the presence of a strong psychological mechanism.
The leader from the first round acquires the image of a probable winner. The majority effect, the desire to join the winning side and the expectation of inevitability begin to operate around him. Thus, the run-off does not start psychologically “from scratch“. The first candidate enters it with accumulated symbolic capital.
Therefore, the task before Iliana Yotova's opponents is not simply to reach the second round. They must nominate a candidate who, in the first round, will come as close as possible to her or will overtake her.
Scenario 1: four separate (leading) candidacies.
With an expected turnout of between 3.2 and 3.5 million people, the final ranges may look approximately like this:
Iliyana Yotova: 1.30-1.50 million votes, or 40-45%;
Andrey Gyurov: 520-700 thousand, or 16-21%;
Daniel Valchev: 450-620 thousand, or 14-19%;
Kostadin Kostadinov: 220-350 thousand, or 7-11%.
With such a distribution, the most likely runoffs are:
Yotova-Gyurov: about 55% probability.
Yotova-Valchev: about 35%.
Yotova–Kostadinov: about 10%.
In this model, the real competition in the first round will not be for the first, but for the second place.
From a political-psychological point of view, this is unfavorable for the democratic and pro-European community. Gyurov and Valchev would compete for partially overlapping groups: moderate, pro-European, right-wing, centrist and institutionally oriented voters.
This could manifest the classic “narcissism of small differences“: close political communities invest more energy in distinguishing between themselves than in opposing their main competitor.
The result would be fragmentation of the pro-European vote and a significant lead for Yotova in the first round. She would enter the runoff not only with more votes, but also with the image of a natural and almost inevitable winner.
Scenario 2: GERB supports Andrey Gyurov.
If GERB did not nominate a separate candidate, but supported Andrey Gyurov without preconditions and without claims to control his candidacy, the elections would acquire a different structure.
With such a configuration, the first round could look approximately like this:
Iliyana Yotova: 1.30-1.48 million votes, or 39-44%;
Andrey Gyurov: 900 thousand-1.15 million, or 28-34%;
Kostadin Kostadinov: 230-350 thousand, or 7-11%.
In the runoff, the difference would already be significant smaller:
Iliyana Yotova: 1.45-1.65 million votes;
Andrey Gyurov: 1.38-1.60 million votes.
In such a hypothesis, I would estimate the initial ratio at approximately 54:46 in favor of Yotova, but the elections could turn into a practically equal race.
However, three conditions are necessary for this.
First, support for Gyurov must be declared early enough. A late announcement can mobilize party cores, but does not leave enough time for a technocrat to become an emotionally recognizable national figure. Political recognition is not just a matter of frequency of media appearances or participation in various community activities. It requires building a symbolic image, a narrative, and a strong emotional connection with voters.
Second, Gyurov must go beyond the identity of a “PP candidate“ or “PP-DB candidate“. Party support can provide an organizational start, but it also sets a psychological ceiling. To be competitive, he must position himself as a candidate of institutional balance, European affiliation, and mutual control between authorities.
Third, the campaign should not be organized as a mechanical unification of “all against Yotova“. Negative identity mobilizes staunch opponents, but rarely creates a broad and sustainable coalition. A positive and principled message is needed: “Independent presidential corrective against the concentration of all power.“
The most difficult psychological test in this model is for GERB.
If the party nominates its own candidate, it can protect its organizational identity and self-esteem, but at the same time increase the probability of Yotova's victory. This would be an example of a conflict between short-term party interest and the broader political goal.
Presidential elections are not won solely by collecting party percentages. They are won by creating a broader political “we“. With four separate candidacies, Iliana Yotova will likely start with a clear advantage. With general and truly supra-party support for Andrey Gyurov, the elections could turn into a real competition.
The formula is simple: Two separate candidacies can satisfy two party identities, but produce one common loss in the so-called democratic space. And the other thing is - there is no time!