Comment by Veselin Stoynev:
The government program of the "Radev" cabinet was adopted on the eve of its 100 days in power. The criticism that it is delayed in itself is justified, but in comparative terms – not particularly. All three cabinets of Boyko Borisov, as well as Saxe-Coburg-Gotha previously presented their government programs within a similar period. But the governments of Ivan Kostov and Kiril Petkov (a program in the form of a coalition agreement), came to power with already ready-made programs. The cabinet of Rosen Zhelyazkov announced such on the 40th day, and the cabinet of Nikolay Denkov – on the 51st.
And this is precisely what is indicative in this historical parallel. Reformist governments start with a clear vision of what they will do from the very beginning or relatively soon after coming to power. Others, who rely more on inertia and managerial detachment or simply have no reform intentions, prefer to delay.
This is exactly what the 200-page management program of “Progressive Bulgaria“ looks like at first glance. It contains nearly 1,000 measures with a 4-year horizon, but there is nothing particularly distinctive in any sector that would give the impression of serious reformism, especially with a rarely seen parliamentary majority. Of course, this can also be called an evolutionary approach to sustainable management. As long as the requests for expected achievements are not proclaimed as grandiose goals.
Let's look at just two of them, which claim to outline the appearance of this governance - the dismantling of the oligarchic model and the new economic model.
Deoligarchization in principle
“The dismantling of the oligarchic model is a mandatory condition for the development of policies in all socio-economic spheres“, is the symbol-creed of the first section of the Program for Governance of the Republic of Bulgaria 2026 - 2030. Beyond the general wishes and the expected results, however, the specific measures for this dismantling are quite modest. By the end of this year, the executive branch is committed to "identifying the persons acting as intermediaries between the top of the oligarchic pyramid on the one hand, and the ministries and law enforcement agencies on the other, and determining their decisions and distributing public resources. Clarifying their connections with employees in the administration." What exactly does this mean, who are the top of this pyramid, is not clear. And is, for example, businessman Georgi Gergov part of this top and would he have a connection with a finance minister if he donated the Plovdiv Fair to him? Also, by the end of the year, the government must identify the "persons in businesses and property" (all or only selected ones?) and carry out "enhanced checks for compliance with income" (how much more and to whom, we will wait to see).
Specific measures, continuing positive expectations
By the end of the year, a revision of key public procurements must be carried out and, in the event of data on crimes, the competent authorities must be notified. By the end of next year, there must be a public “black list“ of compromised public procurement contractors, so that they are not allowed to participate in new tenders. The notorious public platform SIGMA will be connected to the Commercial Register to detect related parties, and from June next year to detect favorable conditions in the announcement of public procurements. Civil servants in positions with the highest corruption risk must pass integrity tests by the end of the year, and such tests are also planned for employees of the Ministry of Interior by June next year. It is also planned that a legislative package for the implementation of the European directive on asset recovery and confiscation will be ready within three months. All measures that prolong the expectation of a result, because there may be one, but it may also be very modest or none at all.
Surprising constitutional changes
In the field of justice, a lower qualified majority is surprisingly envisaged - not 2/3, but 3/5 when electing a Supreme Judicial Council “in order to achieve a constitutional consensus“. That is, until now the consensus was measured in 160 parliamentary votes, now it will drop to 144.
The acts of the SJC will be able to be challenged before an independent body, and members of the council, as well as constitutional judges, will be able to be dismissed early in case of serious violations. The power of the Prosecutor General is not limited, but the investigation can be removed from the judiciary.
Radev also advocates changes to the Constitution that would eliminate the “house book“ and allow the president to decide who to appoint as acting prime minister. “Constitutional guarantee of the right to cash payments as an element of economic freedom“ is also envisaged. This right is guaranteed by European law anyway, which is part of our domestic law, but apparently its inclusion in the constitution will play the role of a consoling curtsy to voters who hoped and some continue to hope that Radev would abolish the euro and bring back the leva.
A new economic model?
“The goal of the Program is to make a transition from the exhausted development model, based on consumption, redistribution and cheap labor, to a new model of accelerated economic growth through active attraction of investments, high productivity and development of an export-oriented, high-tech economy.“ This is the second main pillar of the governance of "Progressive Bulgaria", which is based on the debatable premises of an established economic transformation. Yes, recently growth has mainly depended on consumption growth, because investments are declining. However, cheap labor is taking a back seat and is increasingly left to workers from third countries who are entering the country at an accelerated pace. The redistribution of GDP is not high relative to GDP compared to other highly developed European countries, but it is increasing, and the share of spending on research and development is 3 times lower than the EU average.
However, what does the new government actually offer? The updated consolidated budget forecast until the end of 2028, adopted nearly two months ago (and this is the macro framework for 60% of the time of the full 4-year mandate), relies on an increased 45% redistribution of GDP through the budget, 2.5% economic growth compared to over 3% so far, and an increased debt to over 1/3 of GDP. In other words, we see neither accelerated growth, nor less redistribution, nor how more investments and higher productivity will be achieved, unless business achieves them itself, as it has so far.
Some relief and a pinch of economic diplomacy
Because the management program regarding investments mainly provides for a reduction in administrative measures and deadlines, a tax credit for research and development activities, and a simplified treatment of share options for employees in startups and innovative companies. The active search for investments will be supported by “economic diplomacy“. The specific investments are mainly in European projects and initiatives. The large road infrastructure projects within the mandate will be in project readiness or construction has begun. Pensions will increase annually, but it is not clear whether the Swiss rule will be preserved. In general, the economy will develop as it can, and with some management measures to ease and encourage, God forbid, it will be pushed, not hindered by the state.
Thus, the management program of “Progressive Bulgaria“ at first reading looks promising, but unambitious.