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100 days of Radev's cabinet: calm without changing the model

I deliberately do not go into specifics, because then the conversation about the first 100 days will become much longer and far more uncomfortable

Aug 16, 2026 13:00 55

100 days of Radev's cabinet: calm without changing the model - 1
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The first 100 days of the "Radev" cabinet are already behind us. I can see that they are having a hard time. And this does not surprise me - governing a country is much more difficult than criticizing its governance.

I will not make general conclusions. A hundred days are enough to outline trends, but not for a "final verdict". Therefore, I will throw in a few notes from my bell tower.

First of all - I am calm. This is the first summer since 2021 in which I move calmly through the streets and do not feel like the subject of active events. For me, this is not an unimportant detail, but one of the most significant changes. The Ministry of Interior has a leadership that, at least according to my observations, does not use the system to serve political and local dependencies, self-forgetful mayors and regional party coordinators. If this change proves to be permanent, it deserves to be taken into account.

Secondly - I have not become richer, but I am not complaining either. I do not expect any government to make an individual rich in 100 days. The state is obliged to create conditions for people to be able to achieve well-being on their own - through a functioning economy, predictable rules and fair institutions. So far, the government is not managing along these lines: the rich are getting richer, and the poor - poorer. For the rest, I am grateful to God.

Thirdly - the promised or expected battle with the oligarchic model is not yet in sight. The companies, circles and individuals who have been among the main recipients of public resources and public goods for years remain largely the same. Changing political figures has no particular value if it does not lead to a change in the mechanisms by which the state distributes influence, resources and opportunities. If the model remains, the change at the top is primarily personnel, not systemic.

Fourthly, the administrative and organizational capacity of the government seems to be too concentrated around Nikolay Koprinkov. This is a problem not only personal, but institutional. A country cannot be sustainably governed by a limited circle of people, informal channels and personal dependencies. Strong governance is recognized by strong institutions, not by the strength of the individual intermediary between them.

Fifthly, the communication of the government is beginning to become its own enemy. Ivo Hristov is either tired or going through a serious creative deficit, because some of the prime minister's public messages, instead of closing political topics, produce new scandals and polemics with a negative effect on the government.

Hristov himself should also be significantly more careful in his media appearances and public assessments on various topics. When you are deputy prime minister, you no longer speak solely as an intellectual, analyst or citizen with your own position. Every word is perceived as a word of the authorities and in certain cases - of the state. The freedom to have an opinion remains, but the institutional weight of the position changes the responsibility with which this opinion is expressed.

These are just some of the touches. I am deliberately not going into specifics, because then the conversation about the first 100 days will become much longer and far more uncomfortable.

There is much to analyze - the appointments to power, the doubts and signals of influence peddling and corruption addictions, "Lukoil", the behavior of some of the ruling deputies and the obvious deficit of legal, political and communication capacity in some of them, the different wings in power, the role of the old economic circles, the influence of the former State Security, the strong influence of foreign services (of non-partner countries), the presence of active neo-Nazi groups, dysfunctional special services and the question: to what extent behind the official structure of the government there is a far more complex system of relations and interests between circles around Koprinkov, Gergov, Radev, Dogan, Orlin Aleksiev, GERB, DPS and other representatives of big business and the judiciary.

However, this is a separate and much more serious analysis.

For now, my conclusion for the first 100 days is simpler: there is a change in the perception of the state, but I still don't see enough evidence for a change in the model itself.

And that's exactly where the big test for the "Radev" cabinet lies. Because the government can change the names, cabinets and spokespeople, but real change begins only when it changes the rules, dependencies and the way the state distributes power, influence and public resources.

Regarding the names - they are still the same. With apologies to those people I have omitted. Next time I will correct myself. It is not out of ignorance.