Russian President Vladimir Putin is trying to portray himself as well-informed about the situation on the battlefield in Ukraine, while Russian military bloggers continue to complain that Russian commanders are lying about the advance on the front.
On July 26, during a staged event with the participation of Russian Navy personnel, Putin answered a question about the sources from which he draws information about the front.
Putin said that he relies primarily on information from official sources, but that he analyzes the entire spectrum of information he receives to reach his final conclusions.
This was summarized by the Institute for the Study of War (ISW).
Putin said he receives information from Russian commanders, soldiers, special services and officials.
The Russian president noted that there are also "bloggers" that he sometimes reads, claiming that some of them "hit the mark" and do good work, while others pursue only their own interests.
Putin said that information from unspecified public groups is also sometimes useful, but can include "information garbage" and be "dangerous" for those who lack "a basic understanding of... current events".
However, Russian military bloggers have long complained that Russian commanders and officials lie about Russian successes on the battlefield.
ISW has already noted a leaked Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) map from April 2026, which, for example, depicts greatly exaggerated claims about the Russian front line in the western part of Zaporizhia Oblast.
On July 28, a Russian military blogger stated that the situation for Russian forces was favorable only in the direction of Aleksandrovka, but that "things are worse" in other parts of the front, although Ukrainian authorities have increasingly reported on the successes of the Ukrainian army on the battlefield.
Another Russian military blogger responded by saying that Russian commanders have repeatedly sent assault units on missions based on an inaccurate understanding of the situation on the front, assuming that Russian soldiers were close to the Ukrainian positions they were supposed to attack, when in fact they were still up to four kilometers away.
The Kremlin has apparently attracted to its side several prominent military bloggers who accept and promote the Kremlin-fabricated version of such large-scale Russian offensives, which raises questions about the extent to which Putin's use of "blogger" sources improves his understanding of the real situation on the battlefield.
According to reports, Kremlin officials are considering a wide range of options to support a possible mobilization in the future, while Russian President Vladimir Putin is likely to continue to weigh his options.
The Russian opposition source "Verstka" reported on July 28, citing sources in and close to the Russian government, that Russian authorities are discussing the possible introduction of new restrictions on the Russian population in the event of mobilization after the Russian State Duma elections in September 2026.
"Verstka" cited two political strategists working with the Kremlin who said that "serious" failure at the front or in efforts to recruit Russian soldiers could trigger mobilization, and that some security officials are advocating full or partial martial law to prevent civil unrest in the event of mobilization.
According to the information, security officials are advocating for tougher penalties for violations of currency laws, increased control over foreign assets, restrictions on virtual private networks (VPNs), and the introduction of exit visas.
Russian authorities appear to be discussing holding a mobilization in the fall, but Putin has likely not yet made a final decision. However, the Kremlin is creating conditions that would facilitate mobilization, should Putin decide to hold one in the future.
On July 26, Putin signed a law expanding the access of the "Rosgvardia" and the Russian Ministry of Defense to information on Russian servicemen and their families in the Unified State Register of Civil Registration Services.
This law follows proposals by "Rosgvardia" on July 21 to expand its civil defense regulations to protect Russian society from unspecified "dangers" during mobilization, martial law, and wartime.
ISW continues to believe that mobilization is a very personal decision for Putin, depending on his personal perception of the battlefield situation and the integrity of the Kremlin, and that it is still unclear whether and how Putin will decide to proceed with mobilization.