After almost a year without new cases of North Korean ballistic missile launches against Ukraine, Ukrainian authorities last week reported that Russia had again used such a missile, Reuters points out. According to President Volodymyr Zelensky, preliminary information indicates that a North Korean-made missile was used in the strike on the village of Radushne in the Dnipropetrovsk region.
The first use of North Korean ballistic missiles by Russia was reported in late 2023, when Moscow began receiving weapons from Pyongyang in exchange for economic, technical and political support, Reuters recalls. According to Ukrainian military intelligence, by the beginning of 2025, North Korea had delivered nearly 150 KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles to Russia. However, after the summer of 2025, there were almost no strikes with North Korean missiles, which gave rise to speculation that Russian stocks had been exhausted or that the Kremlin preferred to use its own Iskander missiles. That is why the resumption of North Korean missile strikes is now of serious interest among military analysts.
According to Reuters sources close to the Ukrainian military, the resumption of the use of North Korean missiles probably means that Russia has received a new batch from Pyongyang. This is important not only because of the ammunition itself, but also because it shows that the logistical channel between the two countries is functioning without serious difficulties despite international sanctions. Analysts note that such deliveries would hardly be possible without a significant expansion of military cooperation between the two countries, which in the past two years has already included artillery ammunition, rockets, ballistic missiles and even the sending of North Korean servicemen to support Russian operations.
At first glance, it may seem paradoxical that Russia - one of the world's leading military powers and a country with a developed missile industry - relies on North Korean weapons, Reuters comments. In reality, however, the reasons for this are mainly pragmatic. The Kremlin continues to increase the intensity of combined missile and drone strikes against Ukrainian cities, seeking to simultaneously exhaust air defenses and exert psychological pressure on the civilian population. Such a strategy requires large quantities of ammunition, and each additional North Korean delivery allows Moscow to store part of its own stockpile while maintaining a high tempo of attacks.
Military experts also pay attention to the characteristics of North Korean missiles themselves, Reuters points out. The KN-23 and KN-24 ballistic missiles are similar to the Russian "Iskander" and use a semi-ballistic trajectory that makes them difficult to intercept. Although, according to previous analyses by Ukrainian authorities, these missiles sometimes have problems with accuracy and reliability, they still pose a serious threat, especially when used in combination with Russian missiles and a large number of drones. In such massive attacks, the main goal is often not the absolute precision of each individual missile, but to overload Ukrainian air defenses.
Some analysts believe that the reappearance of North Korean missiles is another sign of how Russia is gradually adapting its military economy, Reuters notes. Rather than relying entirely on domestic production, Moscow is increasingly using a network of external suppliers - primarily North Korea and Iran - to compensate for the sanctions imposed on it. Iranian – Shahed– drones have already become a regular element of Russian air strikes, and North Korean shells and missiles are gradually taking a similar place in the Kremlin's arsenal. In this way, Russia manages to diversify its sources of armaments and reduce the risk of shortages of certain types of weapons.
From a strategic perspective, the resumption of North Korean ballistic missiles also sends a political message, writes the Guardian. It demonstrates that the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement signed in 2024 between Russia and North Korea is gradually acquiring a real military dimension. While initially cooperation mainly consisted of artillery ammunition supplies, it now covers increasingly sophisticated weapons systems and is likely to expand to new forms of military-technical exchange. This means that the war in Ukraine is increasingly becoming a testing ground where various authoritarian states test their ability to cooperate despite international isolation.
At the same time, the reappearance of North Korean missiles should not automatically be interpreted as evidence that Russia is experiencing a critical shortage of ballistic missiles of its own production, the publication notes. Rather, it demonstrates Moscow's desire to expand the range of means with which it can wage a prolonged war of attrition. In a conflict that has been going on for five years, having several independent sources of missile supplies may be no less important than increasing its own production.
One of the immediate consequences of the resumption of the use of North Korean ballistic missiles is additional pressure on Ukrainian air defenses, the Associated Press reports. Ballistic missiles are among the most difficult targets to intercept, and so far the only systems that have proven capable of reliably destroying such threats in Ukraine are the American Patriot systems. Ukrainian authorities have repeatedly warned that the number of both the systems and interceptor missiles at their disposal is limited, while Russia is constantly increasing the scale of its combined air strikes with ballistic and cruise missiles, as well as drones. Each additional source of ballistic missiles makes it easier for Moscow to maintain this pressure for a longer period of time.
The new deliveries are also important for another reason - they provide North Korea with the opportunity to improve its own missile programs, writes the "Financial Times". As early as 2024, Ukrainian officials reported that the accuracy of North Korean missiles used by Russia was gradually improving. This gave rise to speculation among Western analysts that Pyongyang was using the fighting in Ukraine as a kind of testing ground for weapons in real combat conditions. The data that can be collected after each strike - on the reliability, accuracy and behavior of missiles against modern air defense systems - is extremely valuable for the further development of North Korean weapons programs.
This turns military cooperation between Moscow and Pyongyang into a process from which both sides benefit, the publication points out. Russia is getting the ammunition and missiles it needs to keep up its pace of strikes against Ukraine. North Korea, in turn, is getting revenue, access to Russian technology, and practical combat experience it would have had little chance of acquiring otherwise. U.S. and South Korean officials have repeatedly warned that the exchange is likely to include not just weapons for fuel or food, but also technology related to satellites, rocket engines, air defense, and other sensitive areas.
The deepening of this cooperation also raises serious questions for the international sanctions regime, writes the "Economist" magazine. For years, the UN Security Council has passed resolutions banning North Korea from exporting ballistic missiles and related technology. Now, however, one of the permanent members of the Council - Russia - is accused of receiving such supplies. After Moscow blocked the renewal of the mandate of the UN group of experts monitoring compliance with sanctions against Pyongyang in 2024, the international community has even fewer mechanisms to track and document such violations. Analysts say this weakens the effectiveness of the sanctions regime and sets a dangerous precedent for future conflicts.
In addition to the immediate impact on the war in Ukraine, the cooperation between Russia and North Korea also has wider geopolitical implications, the "Financial Times" points out. It fits into the gradual formation of a network of countries that cooperate in the security sphere despite Western sanctions. To varying degrees, this group also includes Iran, Belarus and, according to some analysts, individual Chinese companies accused by the West of supplying dual-use goods. Although these countries have different interests, the war in Ukraine has shown that they can build mutually beneficial mechanisms for the exchange of technology, raw materials and military equipment. This trend is increasingly worrying Western capitals because it suggests that the conflict is already having an impact far beyond the European theater of military operations.
For Ukraine, the resumption of North Korean deliveries of ballistic missiles means that the pressure on its air defenses is likely to remain high in the coming months, the AP notes. For Western allies, this is another argument in favor of accelerated deliveries of Patriot systems, interceptor missiles and other air defense means. For North Korea, the war is becoming an opportunity to strengthen its own military capabilities and its international position through its strategic partnership with Russia.
Ultimately, the information that Russia has again begun to use North Korean ballistic missiles has a significance that goes beyond the purely military aspect, comments the "Financial Times". It is a sign that Moscow continues to successfully compensate for some of the restrictions on its own military production through external supplies, while Pyongyang gains unprecedented access to combat experience and, possibly, to Russian technology. At the same time, this development highlights how difficult it is to limit the military capabilities of countries that are ready to build parallel networks of cooperation outside existing international mechanisms. If this trend continues, it will not in itself change the course of the war, but it could prolong the conflict, increase its cost to Ukraine, and make it even more difficult to find a sustainable political solution, the publication concludes.