Against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine, the tension around Taiwan and the deepening geopolitical confrontation between the US, China and Russia, the visits of Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin to Beijing outlined the new architecture of global politics. Is the world entering a new Cold War, how China is simultaneously using Moscow and Washington for its own strategic goals and why Europe seems increasingly isolated from major decisions… Prof. Tatyana Dronzina - lecturer at the Department of “Political Science“ at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski“, an expert in resolving conflicts.
- Prof. Dronzina, after the visits of Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin to Beijing, can we say that China is now the main geopolitical center around which world politics revolves?
- The short answer is - not quite. But Beijing is consciously working on this perception of reality. The sequence is remarkable in itself. Trump was welcomed in Beijing on May 14-15 with a lavish state banquet and concrete deliveries - $17 billion in annual agricultural purchases by 2028, an order for 200 Boeing aircraft and a promise of Xi's visit to Washington in September. Putin arrived on May 19-20 with a delegation that almost ran into the ceremonial decorations of the previous week, and the Global Times described the arrangement as evidence that Beijing is "rapidly "is becoming the center of global diplomacy," noting that hosting the leaders of the United States and Russia within a week was "an exceptional rarity in the post-Cold War era. These are not two summits of the same type. Xi and Putin signed more than 40 cooperation agreements in the fields of trade, technology and media, and their bilateral trade reached about $ 228 billion in 2025. Analysts themselves describe Putin's visit as an attempt to "maintain the status quo" - against the background of a rather weak Victory Parade, the lowest approval rating since February 2022 and growing fears that Beijing has moved towards Washington after Trump's visit. Realistically, Russia is going to China not because Beijing is the center, but because Moscow has nowhere else to go. And a few words about being the center. In the classical paradigm, this means having a position that determines control over the regional space. Today “centricity” is a function of four variables: material power, alliance networks, infrastructure centrality (financial, technological, logistical), and legitimating capital. China dominates the third (DCEP, BRI, rare earths, shipbuilding), approaches the US in the first, but lags significantly in the second and fourth. The US maintains its advantage in terms of alliances (NATO, AUKUS, QUAD, the Japan-South Korea triangle) and in the sanctions-dollar architecture. This is more of a bipolarity with a Chinese gravitational asymmetry than a China-centric order… And the fact that “Beijing is the new center” is a narrative produced mostly by China itself. So a more accurate formulation would be: Beijing is one of the three key centers in a shrinking polycentric order - but it is the only one that is currently actively producing such an aggressive narrative about its own centrality, and where within a week they came representatives of two other major powers. This is a political achievement of the first order, even if the structural reality is more nuanced.
- Why did Xi Jinping receive Trump first and Putin days later? Is China trying to balance between Washington and Moscow without breaking with anyone?
- The sequence of the two visits is the result of a mixture of circumstances and deliberate planning. Trump was originally supposed to come in April; his visit was postponed because of the Iranian operation, while Putin's was long ago scheduled for May 19-20. But Beijing did nothing to rearrange the sequence, even though it could have. Xi receiving his rival first and only then the "partner without borders" is a political choice disguised as a calendar coincidence.
The meaning of the sequence itself deserves attention. I believe it sends the following messages.
1. The visit Trump's is first, because the US is the structural priority. Russia is tactically convenient, but the US is structurally inevitable. The very principle of Kissinger's triangular diplomacy (the US – USSR - PRC since the 1970s) is now being played out in reverse - China is in the position in which Washington was half a century ago, and Moscow — in the position in which it itself put Beijing in those years.
2. Putin's visit is the second - and this was a pure demonstration of convention. The arrangement tells Moscow what cannot be said directly: do not take us for granted.
Add to this the fact that nothing came out of the meeting with Putin commensurate with the results of the meeting with Trump.
The American visit resulted in $17 billion in annual agricultural purchases until 2028, an order for 200 Boeing aircraft, and a reciprocal state visit by Xi to Washington in September.
From Putin: over 40 framework agreements, rhetoric about the "highest level in history" and promises of accelerated cooperation in the field of artificial intelligence, the digital economy and technological innovation. The first is a check, the second is a checkbook without a clear cover. Now to the real question - Is this balancing?
I think what China is doing is not balancing in this technical sense - it is more like a three-pronged management strategy combined with a classic wedge strategy - the wedge is inserted between two things to split them.
The three-pronged management strategy allows Beijing to simultaneously extract different types of resources from its two partners. From the US - market access, technology transfer (where possible), stability of the financial architecture and time for internal modernization. From Russia - cheap energy (imports of Russian oil grew by 35% in the first quarter of 2026, and bilateral trade reached about $228 billion in 2025), a geopolitical buffer that attracts NATO's attention, diplomatic cover in the Security Council, a testing ground for weapons systems, and perhaps most importantly, the existence of Russia in its current form proves that China is not alone in its revisionism. So the formulation "balances between Washington and Moscow without breaking with anyone" is empirically correct, but analytically misleading. Beijing does not balance between two equals — he manages an asymmetric triangle in which he himself is the apex.
Moscow is an instrument, Washington is a rival that must be both contained and attracted.
The goal is not stability of the triangle as such, but maximizing one's own options within it.
- After the Trump-Xi meeting, has there been a real breakthrough on the issues of tariffs, Taiwan and the trade war, or have we only seen diplomatic gestures without concrete results?
- There were results at the transactional level, but on the structural issues - tariffs, Taiwan and the fundamental architecture of the trade war, the meeting was above all an exercise in managed ambiguity. Both sides produced different descriptions of the same event, which in itself is analytically significant. The meeting follows the pattern that The Heritage Foundation has warned about in advance: a Chinese strategy of “tactically exchanging trade positions while avoiding concessions on strategic priorities.” What was traded were easily reversible trade commitments. What was not traded were: export controls on chips, commitments to Taiwan, the structure of China’s industrial subsidies, military-civilian technology transfers, and fentanyl activities. This raises the real analytical question not “was there a breakthrough?” but who is time working for? If structural positions are not shifting, but only transactional gestures are accumulating, then time is in effect working for the country pursuing a long-term industrial and technological strategy (Beijing) rather than the country treating each meeting as a separate deal (Washington). This asymmetry in the strategic horizon is, in the deepest sense, the true outcome of the meeting.
- Does Taiwan remain the most dangerous point in US-China relations, and is it possible that this issue will trigger a global crisis in the coming years?
- Taiwan is structurally the most dangerous node, but its usual presentation - as a question of “possible invasion in 2027“, is analytically misleading. The real risks are more nuanced, more spread out over time, and at the same time more likely than the fixation on a major amphibious operation suggests.
In fact, the situation is unique: no other point of friction between the United States and China combines four characteristics at once:
-- an existential stake for both sides (Beijing treats “unification“ as a central element of the “great revival“ by 2049, and the United States sees the defense of Taiwan as a test for the entire Indo-Pacific architecture of alliances);
-- a complete absence of a diplomatic compromise that would satisfy both sides (unlike trade disputes, there is no middle ground here);
-- a unique economic concentration (TSMC produces about 90% of the world's leading chips);
-- a geographical position in the First Island Chain, which involves Japan, the Philippines, and Australia through allied commitments
This in combination is something that neither the South China Sea, nor the Korean Peninsula, nor even the Iran-US confrontation offer. What is the situation after meeting with Beijing? What we saw at the Xi-Trump meeting on May 4 confirms the persistence of the problem. But it seems to me that one thing is being missed: the goal for 2027, described in Chinese internal documents, is a “capability“, not a “schedule“ - but external observers often confuse the two.
- After Putin's visit, can we talk about the formation of a real anti-Western bloc between Russia and China?
- No, if by “bloc“ we understand the category from the Cold War - a formal alliance with mutual defense commitments, ideological coherence and integrated structures. Yes, if by “bloc“ we understand something much looser - coordinated action of revisionist forces with asymmetrical interests. In other words - we have intense asymmetrical dependence, but not structural integration, characteristic of a bloc.
- To what extent are relations between Moscow and Beijing equal, or is Russia gradually becoming a dependent partner of China due to sanctions and the war in Ukraine?
- The relations are categorically not equal, and the war in Ukraine is the point that turned a gradual shift into structural dependence. At the same time - and this is analytically important - “dependence“ is not the same as “subordination“. Russia has lost economic autonomy, but not autonomy in terms of nuclear policy, military decisions or domestic political control. This distinction is more significant than it seems at first glance.
- Progress on the “Siberia-2“ gas pipeline project was pointed out as a litmus test for how much China is ready to give in to Russia. Who won the battle for the price of blue fuel in these negotiations and is Russia becoming a completely dependent raw material appendage of Beijing?
- The battle for the price was, and continues to be, won by China. To this same question about “raw material appendage“ the answer is nuanced: the direction is definitely this, but Russia is not yet a complete raw material appendage - it is in the process of becoming one, at a speed that the “Power of Siberia-2“ case itself illustrates with almost textbook clarity. A more precise formulation would be: Russia is in a transition from a semi-periphery with a strong state to a peripheral position with a preserved sovereign apparatus - something that has not existed in its pure form in the world economy so far. This is a hybrid formation that is both politically sovereign and economically dependent. If and when “The Power of Siberia -2“ is signed at a price close to the Chinese demands (which is the most likely scenario, since Moscow cannot afford to refuse), the consequences will be:
-- locking of Russian gas flows to China for 30+ years on terms favorable to the buyer;
-- total Chinese imports of Russian gas of ~88 billion cubic meters (“Power of Siberia-1“ + “Power of Siberia-2“), which represents about 20% of China's gas needs;
-- for Russia - the only large market for Yamal gas, which was developed for Europe;
-- structural fixation of Russia's position as a supplier with low pricing power;
This is, in its purest form, a contractual form of resource capitulation - tying a national strategic asset (Yamal gas fields) to long-term terms that will be considered disadvantageous in almost any future state of the world in which Russia has other market options. But that is precisely why Beijing is waiting - for the moment when Moscow will sign on these terms.
- What does the fact that Putin speaks of an “unprecedented level“ of relations with China, while Beijing continues to maintain active economic ties with the US, indicate?
- The discrepancy between Russian discourse and Chinese behavior is one of the most accurate diagnostic indicators of the very nature of the relationship. When two counterparties describe the same partnership with a dramatically different rhetorical register, this is not a misunderstanding - these are the data of reality. And these data show that Moscow needs the framework of an “unprecedented level“ to give meaning to its strategic position, while Beijing does not need such a framework, because the real distribution of power already supports it without the need for rhetorical exaggeration. While Putin speaks of an “unprecedented level“ relations, Beijing is simultaneously signing billions in agricultural deals with the US, refusing to defend Russia against its own banking systems, and actively working towards a reciprocal state visit by Xi to Washington. This is not an “unprecedented partnership” - it is an instrumental relationship in which the Chinese side maintains an optimized position across all its major geopolitical vectors.
- Are we seeing a new model of global confrontation — the US versus the China-Russia axis, or are the relations much more pragmatic than they appear publicly?
- Neither one nor the other - and that is precisely why the case is analytically interesting. What we are seeing is neither a return to the US-USSR model of 1950-1989, nor a purely pragmatic balancing act in which ideology and geopolitical structure are irrelevant. This is a new configuration that does not fit well into any of the inherited theoretical models - and this is precisely why political analysts on both sides of the Atlantic are tempted to package it in old frameworks that distort its understanding. There are real elements of the Cold War in it:
-- military buildup;
-- formation of alternative institutions (BRICS+, SCO, CIPS);
-- nuclear modernization;
-- competition in new domains (cyberspace, artificial intelligence, space), etc.
But the framework misses several fundamental differences:
-- first, economic interdependence is unprecedented;
-- second, ideological universalism is absent;
-- third, most countries hedge, do not choose.
It is not a question of pure pragmatism, because the deals at the top exist on a conflict structure, do not cancel it. Moreover, the friend-enemy binomial continues to be present, even as economic activity continues. And finally, ideological differences, although not universal, have not disappeared. What we see is more accurately described by distinguishing three different levels of relations, each with its own logic:
-- transactional diplomacy at the summit - this is the level of Trump-Xi in Beijing, Putin-Xi in Beijing, of summits and signatures. Pragmatism dominates here. Concrete deals are made, concrete numbers are announced, the ceremonial is performed. At this level, looking at the configuration seems peaceful and stable.
-- institutional and structural architecture. This is the level of financial systems (SWIFT vs. CIPS), technological chains (TSMC vs. Chinese semiconductors), military exercises and alliance architecture (NATO+QUAD+AUKUS vs. SCO+ASEAN+others). Fragmentation dominates here. The two systems are moving away, parallel structures are developing, economic interdependence is gradually but systematically decreasing.
-- cognitive, informational and narrative space. This is the level of disinformation, of influencing elections, of shaping public opinion, of cultivating sympathizers in third countries. Here, intense competition dominates, often stronger than what is seen in the upper two layers.
- Can China really influence the war in Ukraine, and why is Beijing avoiding exerting greater pressure on the Kremlin?
- China has a real and significant ability to influence the war - probably greater than that of any other country, including the United States, but it does not exercise it because preserving the ability, not using it, corresponds to the Chinese strategic calculation. When we talk about China and Russia, referring to the war in Ukraine, we have before our eyes a textbook case of what in the theory of coercive diplomacy is called “unexercised coercion“ (unexercised coercion) - a position that produces strategic value precisely through its restraint.
- What is the big message of these two visits to Europe - the world is entering a new multipolar system, but where is the EU in the scheme?
- The message is harsh and unambiguous - Europe is structurally pushed out of the places where its destiny is decided. Not through a dramatic gesture of exclusion, but through the more subtle procedure of no one inviting it because no one considers it necessary. This is more offensive than open hostility and strategically more dangerous. And - I return to your third question - the European Union could be the real third pole of the emerging order, but it is not, because its structural vulnerabilities remain unresolved. Between “could“ and “is not“ lies the whole drama of the current European moment.
The EU is big enough to be the third fulcrum, but too fragmented to act as such.
Between potential and realization lies precisely the gap in which Moscow and Beijing operate. The two visits to Beijing in May 2026 sent a message to Europe that was not verbally spoken but was structurally unambiguous: Europe is imagined as a decorative element of an order that is being built without it. This message must be understood not only by European governments, but also by European societies, because ultimately the attitude towards it is a matter of collective political will.