The intense diplomatic maneuvering to shape the end of the war in Ukraine has revealed a disturbing reality: Even when it comes to its own security, the European Union is struggling to be a central player, writes Stephen Everts, director of the EU Institute for Security Studies, in an article for "Politico".
The ongoing negotiations over the future of Ukraine - a conflict that European leaders routinely describe as "existential" - are taking place with minimal input from the bloc. And while others set the tone and direction, Europe remains reactive: managing the fallout, limiting the damage and hoping to regain its influence.
This marginalization is not the result of a single decision or a single person - no matter how important US President Donald Trump may be. Rather, it reflects a deeper vulnerability and a disturbing pattern.
Anyone who looks at Europe’s elections in recent months can see a psychology of weakness. It paints a picture of a continent lacking courage, incapable of taking decisive action even when its core interests are at stake and when political alternatives are at hand. Europe is losing confidence, sinking into fatalism, and justifying its passivity with the reassuring thought that it has no real choice because its cards are weak. Besides, in the long run, things will work out. Just wait for the US midterm elections.
But will it work out? And can Europe afford to wait?
Ukraine certainly cannot.
Just commenting on others’ draft peace plans in some form of "diplomacy of change" is not enough. Solutions are needed, and they are needed now. Europe is a continent of rich countries with great potential. But while its leaders insist that Ukraine’s security and success are essential to Europe’s own security and survival, its actual military aid to Kiev has declined in recent months.
Financially, Europe is failing to meet its own self-imposed test. Ukraine needs an estimated €70 billion a year – a large sum, yes, but it amounts to just 0.35% of EU GDP. That is well within Europe’s collective capacity. Yet for months, member states have been unable to agree on mechanisms for using frozen Russian assets or on suitable alternatives that could keep Ukraine afloat.
Instead, we are witnessing hesitation and the triumph of small-mindedness. It is also quite telling that the US attempt to simply impose how these assets are used, with 50% of the profits going to Washington instead of Kiev, is finally prodding Europe into action.
Unfortunately, the psychology of Europe’s weakness is just as visible in the economic realm, as the EU-US trade deal concluded in July was a classic case of how fragility can be disguised as "pragmatism".
Brussels had the tools to respond to Washington’s tariffs and coercive measures, including through counter-tariffs and its anti-coercion instrument. But under pressure from member states, fearful of a broader US withdrawal from European security and Ukraine, it decided not to use them. The result was a unilateral "deal" with a 15% unilateral tariff that violates World Trade Organization rules and obliges Europe to make hundreds of billions of dollars worth of energy purchases and investments in the United States.
Even worse, the deal has not delivered the stability that was touted as its main benefit. Washington has since labeled Europe’s energy transition measures and technology regulations as "trade barriers" and "taxes on American companies," signaling that further retaliatory steps may follow. Last week, the United States stepped up the pressure again when its trade representatives met with EU ministers and openly challenged existing EU technology rules.
The EU is designed to be more of an economic and regulatory superpower than a defense power. Despite decades of using its economic clout for political ends, however, the EU is now left behind, facing an expanding transatlantic power play in trade and technology.
Similar patterns of retreat mark the EU’s actions in other areas. Russia has escalated its hybrid military operations against the bloc’s critical infrastructure, but Europe’s response remains hesitant. China has dramatically weaponized its control over the export of critical minerals, but Europe continues to react late and without clear coordination. And in the Middle East, despite being one of the leading donors to Gaza, Europe has been peripheral in shaping any plans for a ceasefire and reconstruction.
In crisis after crisis, Europe’s role has not only been small, but increasingly shrinking. The question is when will Europeans decide they are fed up with this weakness and irrelevance?
This is above all a question of psychology, of belief in one’s own capabilities, including the ability to say "no". But this is only possible if Europe invests in its ability to make important decisions together - through shared political power and financial resources. There is no way out of this without investing in a stronger EU.
This basic argument has been made hundreds of times before. But while the call for "more political will" among member states is indeed right, it is also oversimplified. We must recognize that building a stronger EU means giving up something. But in return we will gain something essential: the ability to stand our ground in a world of Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping.
This is both necessary and invaluable.