DW: Let's start with a more personal question - when and whether you managed to overcome the trauma of the so-called “Renaissance Process“? Did the families who moved to Turkey cope with it better, or was it a second trauma for them?
A page not read to the end
I experienced the criminal act of the so-called “Renaissance Process“ in my childhood. Then, in my youth, I had to rethink things, relying on the worldview of the great mystic Mevlana, who says: “Love the creatures for the sake of the Creator“. And so I distinguished that state and its rulers from Bulgaria after 1989, as well as the state from its citizens, who cannot be held responsible for the actions of its rulers. I realized that I would not give anyone the privilege of hurting or rejecting me because of my identity.
But that period of our history continues to be an “unread page“, especially with the lack of a clear position and responsibility on the part of the state to this day. The issue of the forcibly taken names has not been resolved. Ordinary citizens live in a post-trauma. The permanent anxiety of the victims does not lead to the healing of the wounds. The swamp of the past, the unresolved cases hanging for decades, the unspoken traumas, the leaving of a crime without consequences leads to a feeling of impunity. Hence the insult to the state.
Indifference and oblivion lead to personal crises. The forced name change was not a one-time act, carried out at the end of 1984 and the beginning of 1985. That was the culmination for the Turks, while for the Pomaks and Roma Muslims it took place before that. The return of the names in 1990 did not take place through official channels, i.e. the citizens did not automatically receive the names that were forcibly taken from them. Instead, their names were entered by administrative officials, as they saw fit. I think that our emigrants in Turkey also found themselves in a similar situation. They had to start from scratch in a new reality, which they had to deal with very quickly.
DV: What is the attitude of today's Turks towards today's Bulgarians – Is there any sense of imperial superiority left?
Emigrants regularly return to Bulgaria
The attitude towards Bulgaria and the Bulgarian people has a positive connotation, unlike the attitude towards the perpetrators of the so-called “Revival Process“ and the expulsion of ethnic Turks in 1989. The emigrants regularly return to Bulgaria, taking care of their properties and sharing with affection what they experienced in Bulgaria.
The most eloquent attitude when meeting a fellow Bulgarian in Turkey is always warm, neighborly, regardless of whether he is a fellow Bulgarian, an emigrant or a local. Along with this, in Turkey you can feel a sense of imperial superiority among extreme nationalists, but even among them Bulgaria and Bulgarians are not considered enemies.
DV: Has Islam today become a state ideology in Turkey and are there sanctions for resistance to its dogmas?
In an interview, Professor Olivier Rois, one of the prominent researchers of Islamism, emphasizes that even before the rule of Recep Erdogan, Turkey was not secular, because religion was controlled by the state. Under Erdogan's rule, this control over religion intensified, acquired unprecedented dimensions and funding from the state. Religion is used for propaganda purposes and acquiring political dividends. Islamism has not yet become an official state ideology in Turkey, but it is an important means of controlling the supporters of the Turkish president. In the same interview, Prof. Roa adds that Erdogan failed to Islamize the heart and mind of Turkey, so he Islamized objects. This is how we can summarize, for example, the story of the transformation of “Hagia Sophia“ back into a mosque. Symbols are extremely important for Islamists.
DV: What is the reason why Recep Erdogan, from a factor in the democratization of the country between 2002 and 2010, subsequently hardened his regime to an openly repressive one? Could this have been prevented if Turkey had been admitted to the EU?
There are no ifs in history. Nevertheless, European leaders bear responsibility for not providing sufficient support to democratically minded circles in Turkey. If Turkey had been admitted to the EU - its readiness is another matter - Erdogan would not have had free rein to act brutally against the civil and political opposition in the country. We would not have seen the thousands of oppositionists imprisoned, the purges carried out in the state administration, the judiciary, the military, education, etc. Thousands were dismissed by presidential decrees, and millions were punished with social isolation. Those dismissed from office by presidential decree, after serving the imposed sentence or being acquitted, cannot find a new job because they are stigmatized by the state.
Why did Erdogan harden his regime to an openly repressive one? In his own words: “For me, democracy is like a tram. When I arrive at my destination, I get off it“. To achieve his goal - a presidential republic of the "Turkish type", where the government is hereditary, he will stop at nothing. Facade democracy is in his service.
DV: Ten years later, do we know whether there was really an attempted military coup against Erdogan or whether he used it as a pretext to deal politically and physically with his opponents?
The events of 2016 did not fit into the usual pattern
We will hardly ever learn the full truth about the events of 2016, as long as there are circles that used them to achieve their goals. The former leader of the opposition Republican People's Party, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, described the events as a "controlled coup attempt". That is, some of the ruling party knew about the actions of some military personnel and used them for their own purposes. Over time, the questions that remained without official answers increased. The Turkish military has solid experience with coups. But the events of 2016 do not fit into the usual pattern. Why did it all start after 9:00 PM on July 15, when Turkish citizens were still on the streets, and not in the early hours of the night, as usually happens? Why were communications and transport links not disrupted? Why were the military's actions limited to Istanbul and the capital Ankara? Why has not a single member of the ruling party or opposition politician been arrested? How is it possible that Erdogan and his ministers can go live on television and immediately announce the culprit? It is as if the events were set up to happen before the eyes of the whole world.
But the fact is that hundreds of civilians and conscripts died. Neither Erdogan nor any of the ruling party gave official testimony in court. Those directly responsible were subsequently rewarded, instead of being fired and tried for allowing all this to happen. The then head of the Turkish intelligence services, MIT, became foreign minister, and the chief of the general staff, Hulusi Akar, defense minister.
It was after the coup attempt that Erdogan managed to impose a presidential republic of the “Turkish type“ and after the imposed state of emergency, he carried out the purge, in which he removed all dissenters. Fear is an active force in Turkish society, and hostility is now the norm! Stigmatization, labeling is a means of dealing with the enemy. Nine years have passed since the coup attempt, and the arrests continue. The state of emergency has been lifted de jure, but de facto it is in full force. Everything that was claimed to be impossible to happen is now a fact in Turkey. Erdogan rolled through the country's democratic foundations like a roller coaster, and now it is the turn of the political opposition. Some time ago, even the supporters of the Turkish president could not imagine the former mayor of Istanbul in prison, but currently there is talk of closing down the party to which he belongs - the Republican People's Party (RHP), founded personally by Kemal Ataturk.
DV: Will Erdogan manage to remove Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu from the presidential race? Can we count on the court to protect him? And the citizens of Istanbul?
The result was 3:0 in favor of İmamoğlu
Ekrem İmamoğlu's presidential candidacy is a nightmare for Erdogan. İmamoğlu's election victories in Istanbul against the Turkish president are 3:0 in favor of the opposition candidate. If we use football terminology, Erdogan, who played football in his youth, showed a red card to Imamoglu and would not allow him on the electoral field.
According to the current constitution, the Turkish president must have completed a higher education with a term of 4 years. And Imamoglu's higher education diploma was canceled before he was sent to the largest prison in Europe - Silivri.
But here we should draw a parallel with Erdogan himself. He has not yet been able to present a diploma of completed higher education with which to satisfy public interest. In addition, according to the Turkish constitution, presidential terms are limited to two. Erdogan is currently serving his third term as president and no one doubts that he will run again. In such a case, it is appropriate to ask the question in which direction public discontent should accumulate? How adequate are the actions of the leaders of the political opposition? In the situation that has arisen, is there such a brave judge who would protect the rights of Ekrem Imamoglu?
DV: Does Imamoglu continue to have categorical support from his own Republican People's Party - the so-called Kemalists, or are they also forced to seek a compromise with the ruling party? What could it consist of?
The peace process with the Kurds
Officially, Imamoglu has the full support of his party. But sometimes the idea creeps into the public sphere that, if he fails to run for elections for understandable reasons, another successful candidate would be, for example, the mayor of the capital Ankara, Mansur Yavas. The party leader, Özgür Özel, has made public statements that, in a last resort, he would also run for president. It is very difficult to talk about a compromise option for the Kemalists with Erdogan. Erdogan needs an opposition that can show the world community that his regime is democratic. He currently controls the processes in Turkey. Another question is who he will allow to face him in a possible presidential election.
DV: On whose side is the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP), which is the priority vote of the Kurds, and which is the third largest after Erdogan's Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Republican People's Party?
A new peace process is currently underway in Turkey with the Kurds, which began at the end of last year after a surprising call by the leader of the nationalists and Erdogan's unofficial coalition partner in the government, Devlet Bahceli. And after a call by its leader Abdullah Öcalan, who is in a Turkish prison, the terrorist PKK announced that they would lay down their weapons and seek a political solution to the Kurdish problem. In parallel, the pro-Kurdish HDP party began to use the rhetoric of the ruling party more often, as well as to pursue a more favorable policy towards them.
Let us emphasize that Selahattin Demirtaş, former co-chair of the pro-Kurdish Peace and Democracy Party, which merged with the Peoples' Democratic Party, has been in a Turkish prison since 2016 because he allowed himself to publicly state that they would not support Erdogan's candidacy for president and that the Kurds would not allow him to be elected. After the presidential elections in 2023, however, he announced from prison that he was withdrawing from active politics and is currently expected to be released.
DV: Was Erdogan's party really the first or was it the result of vote manipulation by a repressive government? In general, how does Erdogan achieve this and what is the reason for his support, despite the country's economic problems?
Erdogan's party lost its leading position in the 2024 local elections, and since then, surveys have given the Kemalist party a lead of several points. But after winning the local vote, the leader of the People's Nationalist Party, Özgür Özel, in a very strange way, took a course of "normalizing relations" with Erdogan and his AKP. The demands of the voters were not put forward by the opposition to the ruling party. It was only after the arrest of İmamoğlu that Özgür Özel took a tougher course. Although Erdogan's party is in second place, according to sociologists, he has a solid core that supports him fanatically and unconditionally. In addition, those with clientelistic attitudes, as well as the socially weak, hope for him. The country's economic situation in this case has been transformed from a defect into an effect for the ruling party. They have very skillfully instilled in the people that if Erdogan is not in power, they will remain hungry. All this makes about 30% support for the Turkish president's party. When you add control of the state apparatus, you get the desired result.
Erdogan is convenient for the West
DV: Is there a limit to the West's tolerance of Erdogan's regime because of his role as a “brake“ for refugees? By this logic, can we expect that the sanctions under the “Magnitsky“ law in our country can also be lifted if the US or Britain benefit from those sanctioned?
Towards the Erdogan regime, the West has replaced values with interests, which in the case of refugees has yielded the desired result. But every favor has a price. The refugee crisis was used by the Turkish president as a trump card against his European partners, and they very conveniently kept quiet about everything that is happening in our southern neighbor. Erdogan is a pragmatist and is ready to work with anyone, as long as questions are not raised about the state of democracy and human rights in Turkey. The geopolitical situation is extremely favorable for Erdogan - the war in Ukraine, the situation in the Middle East. In recent months, the issue of the state of the opposition in Turkey, nor of Imamoglu in prison, has not been on the agenda in Western capitals. Erdogan is convenient for the West because he plays the game of chance with them. Unfortunately, history shows that Western countries have worked and continue to work successfully with authoritarian leaders and outspoken dictators.
The example of Ahmed al-Sharaa in Syria is indicative. He was on the US terrorist blacklist, with a $10 million bounty on his head, but he is now the president of Syria and was on an official visit to the White House with President Donald Trump. Whether, when and for whom interests could prevail in favor of those sanctioned under the “Magnitsky“ law remains to be seen.
Georgi Lozanov talks to Tayfur Hussein.