Someone, whoever it is, is sinking ships in the Black Sea, and the most powerful military alliance in the world – NATO is watching from the sidelines. Classic!
The Black Sea is increasingly becoming a test not only for regional security, but also for NATO's authority. When someone manages to carry out attacks, sink ships and create security risks in the waters bordering three Alliance member states - Bulgaria, Turkey and Romania, the question inevitably arises: where is the defense alliance, which for decades has presented itself as a guarantor of the security of its members?
The paradox is obvious. NATO has a huge military potential, modern technologies, intelligence capabilities, naval forces and mechanisms for coordination between allies. On PAPER, this is the most powerful military-political alliance in the world. But what does this power look like when attacks are carried out in the immediate vicinity of its member states, vessels are sunk, and the feeling is created that someone else is setting the rules in the Black Sea?
This is exactly where the essence of the problem lies. Because it is not about perceiving NATO as a factor capable not only of demonstrating strength, but also of protecting security and deterring actions that threaten its members. Someone acts, and NATO simply observes. Someone changes the situation on the ground, changes the map of the world, and the Alliance observes.
Yes, Turkey, Bulgaria, and Romania are members of NATO, but this does not mean that every attack in the Black Sea automatically constitutes an attack on the Alliance. However, this does not negate the fundamental question: what is the practical value of collective security if member states remain exposed to risks that cannot be contained by convincing and coordinated action?
This is precisely what creates the opportunity for strategic humiliation.
It is not necessary for someone to defeat NATO in direct military confrontation to question its authority. Sometimes it is enough to demonstrate that it can take action in a sensitive area, force the adversary to come to terms with the new reality, and leave allies to argue about the nature of the response. Thus, the military problem becomes a political one.
For Bulgaria, this issue is particularly important. The Black Sea is not a distant conflict that can be observed from a safe distance. It is an immediate part of our security environment. Instability there affects shipping, trade, energy infrastructure, maritime communications, and the sense of security of the entire region. Bulgaria has an interest not just in being present in NATO, but in being part of an alliance that understands the specific risks for its eastern flank and has real capabilities to limit them.
Against the backdrop of the several ships sunk in the Black Sea within a period of about ten days, perhaps we should finally ask ourselves a broader question: do you now understand what the Baltic states are experiencing and what threat they face when it comes to sea routes and shipping security? When incidents accumulate, and the sea, which should be a space for trade and free movement, becomes a zone of insecurity, the threat ceases to be an abstract concept. For the countries of the Baltic region, this is not just a theoretical scenario, but a constant need to think about the protection of shipping, underwater infrastructure and critical communications.
Therefore, it is not enough for Bulgarian citizens to hear that NATO membership in itself guarantees security. Membership is a strategic advantage, but its value also depends on the willingness of allies to build common capabilities, share intelligence, protect critical infrastructure, and respond in a coordinated manner to threats. The most dangerous thing for NATO is not that someone can sink an individual ship. The most dangerous thing is if someone begins to see and believe that they can do it again and again without encountering consequences that change their calculations.
And here we come to the most unpleasant conclusion. If someone manages to strike, create uncertainty, and dictate the pace of events, while NATO seems unable to impose a convincing security framework, then that someone wins not only an operational advantage. They also win a battle of perceptions. And in international politics, perceptions of strength and weakness sometimes matter almost as much as actual military capabilities.
NATO should be a symbol of collective defense, not an acronym behind which allies hide while someone else demonstrates that they can act according to their own rules. NATO is not obliged to start a war because of every incident. But it is obliged to prove that it has the strategy, capabilities and political will to prevent the Black Sea from becoming a space where someone acts and the alliance only looks on.
NATO — collective defense alliance, or „NA TI“ — someone shows you how your authority is being undermined while you look on?