German political scientist Konstanze Stelzenmüller is an expert on the US and Europe at the Brookings Institution think tank in Washington.
US President Donald Trump had hoped to conclude an agreement that would end Russia's war against Ukraine by Christmas. Negotiations were held in Miami with representatives of Moscow and Kiev. What are the chances?
Konstantze Stelzenmüller: In my opinion, judging by what we heard from Putin at his annual press conference, and also by the words of his adviser Ushakov after the talks in Miami, we are still quite far from that. Putin said that Russia has an absolute military-strategic advantage on the battlefield. And the proposals discussed and put forward by the Ukrainians, according to Russian sources, are quite unconstructive.
The news from Miami says that some progress has been made on the issue of security guarantees for Ukraine. We do not know what this means. Earlier there was talk of guarantees for Ukraine comparable to Article 5 of NATO. Do you consider such a thing likely, given that Russia is against Ukraine's membership in NATO? Why should Russia agree to guarantees comparable to this?
Constanze Stelzenmüller: Either security guarantees are provided on the principle of Article 5 or not. There is no middle ground. I think that all that can be at least somewhat convincing from the US side is a reliable promise that America will come to the aid of, say, the European security forces in Ukraine. The assistance can take various forms. The Americans continue to provide Europe with a nuclear umbrella. They continue to provide Europe, and hence Ukraine, with satellite intelligence, etc. I think that security guarantees will only be convincing if they are about real military support. I find it hard to believe that at the moment.
Donald Trump is positioning himself as a mediator in Russia's war against Ukraine, and not as a partner of Ukraine, like the Europeans, for example. And in Europe, including Germany, the media and politicians are spreading the idea that Trump is actually on Russia's side. Some people disagree with that. What do you think?
Constanze Stelzenmüller: I wouldn't say that Trump generally supports Russia, but he is wavering between supporting Ukraine and supporting Russia's position. And then he retreats to this so-called mediatory position, which does not contribute at all to strengthening confidence in Western support for Ukraine.
According to surveys, most Americans still want the United States to support Ukraine. Support for Ukraine is also present in American politics, both among Democrats and Republicans, i.e. in Trump's own party. How big is the political risk for Donald Trump if he stops supporting Ukraine?
Constanze Stelzenmüller: About a week ago, the National Security Strategy guaranteed that the Pentagon would not be able to withdraw its troops from Europe, etc. From these actions, it is clear that significant support remains not only among the American public, but also among American politicians. But if the question is what could affect Trump's popularity, I personally do not think it is Ukraine. I think he is currently struggling with other issues that are more related to domestic policy than foreign policy.
French President Emmanuel Macron wants to talk directly with Russian President Vladimir Putin again. He has already spoken to him on the phone. Now they will probably meet in person. It is not certain yet, but what do you think, is this a good idea? Can it lead to any results? And why Macron and not Merz?
Constanze Stelzenmüller: I suppose Macron is coordinating his actions with the other European powers and with the White House. The more important point that I would like to make here is that the Europeans and the Ukrainians have started to buy time quite well. I think most of us know that this is exactly what we are doing. We are buying time with Putin. We are buying time with the White House. The more important question is how we use this time. Are we using it to improve our defense system, to put important defense and deterrence systems into operation, to start weapons production in Ukraine or for Ukraine? I think that after the publication of the US National Security Strategy, we realized that the time frame needed to become less vulnerable to coercion, including from the Trump administration, is now much shorter.