After Ukraine, Vladimir Putin has made the Arctic region his "absolute priority", much more than Eastern Europe, for both strategic and economic reasons. This was stated in an interview with the French daily L'Express by Mikhail Komin, a researcher at the Center for European Policy Analysis.
It is claimed that this is "Vladimir Putin's main priority" after Ukraine, but despite this, we know very little about the Kremlin's Arctic program. Over the past five years, budget spending on the Arctic has almost doubled.
"This is a radical change, especially given the inflationary context and the turmoil that the Russian economy has experienced over the past three years", warns Komin.
According to him, this is due to two deep-rooted fears in the Kremlin. Namely: the fear of losing military dominance in the region as NATO expands and its natural defenses are eroded by global warming, but also uncertainty about Russia's ability to extract natural resources in the region, while sanctions prevent it from acquiring the necessary technologies to do so. Given Vladimir Putin's ambitions, but also those of Donald Trump, this region could become the "next point of military confrontation" for Europe.
L'EXPRESS: In your opinion, in recent years, Vladimir Putin has made the Arctic one of his priorities. But back in 2007, a scientific mission planted the flag of the Russian Federation at the North Pole. What has changed since then?
MIKHAIL KOMIN: In fact, Russia’s interest in the Arctic, and even that of the Soviet Union, dates back a long time. However, in the 2000s, Russia tended to support the Western idea that the Arctic should be a zone exclusively of peaceful and humanitarian cooperation. The 2007 episode was a clumsy attempt by Russia to justify its claims to part of the Arctic shelf within the framework of international structures. At that time, the Kremlin preferred international instruments for cooperation in the Arctic.
But according to Russian officials we interviewed for our follow-up study, Vladimir Putin has been monitoring the region since the second half of the 2010s. Russia’s new foreign policy doctrine, developed in 2023, places this region as Moscow’s second priority after the post-Soviet space. This is a turning point that should not be overlooked: in the 1990s and 2000s, the Arctic was not even among the Kremlin's priorities! Similarly, some signals, such as recent Russian investments in civilian infrastructure in the Arctic region - such as ports, cities and local industry - should serve as a warning.
Not to mention that Moscow is also trying to revive its military bases and continues to invest heavily in... nuclear submarines and nuclear icebreakers. Over the past five years, budget spending on the Arctic has almost doubled. This is a radical change, especially considering the inflationary context and the turmoil that the Russian economy has experienced over the past three years.
These Arctic ambitions are also reflected in the public statements of the Russian president, who increasingly mentions the region in his speeches. A year ago, he participated in the opening of a new plant for the production of Russian liquefied natural gas. Last spring, he also attended an event aboard a nuclear submarine, during which he stated that Russia intended to "finish" Ukraine.
It seems to me that he deliberately chose a nuclear submarine as the backdrop for these threatening words. So, a lot has changed since 2020, both in terms of budget spending and the interests of the leadership. Especially, I repeat, if we take into account the current priorities in Ukraine and the economic problems arising from this war.
L'EXPRESS: Why the Arctic?
MIKHAIL KOMIN: Russia's ambitions in the Arctic are dictated by two deep-seated security concerns. The first is the fear of losing military dominance in the region as NATO expands and its natural defenses are eroded due to global warming. According to most Russian and Western experts, 60% of Moscow's nuclear response capacity is concentrated in northern waters, aboard its nuclear submarines.
In short, Russia’s ability to deploy these ships in the northern seas without being detected by the enemy is central to its nuclear deterrence strategy. However, as technology advances, NATO bases move closer to Russia’s northern borders, and the ice melts, the Kremlin fears that its submarines are not sufficiently stealthy. It is therefore increasingly concerned about its security and its ability to respond in the event of a major war with NATO.
The second source of vulnerability concerns Russia’s ability to extract natural resources, such as gas and oil, in the Arctic. According to Moscow, 80% of the country’s natural gas is located in this region, as well as 17% of its oil reserves. But most of these resources are difficult to exploit because of sanctions imposed on Russia since 2014, which prevent it from acquiring the necessary technologies.
This situation is even more worrying because the resources available elsewhere are dwindling. Of course, there are ways to circumvent the sanctions, notably by relying on China, but even so, many of the Russian companies trying to expand into the Arctic region to extract these resources are years behind schedule. This situation, which has not improved with the imposition of new sanctions after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, is causing deep concern in the Kremlin.
For these two reasons, Putin simply cannot afford to lose interest in the Arctic.
L'EXPRESS: Vladimir Putin recently announced that Russia will discuss joint projects with the United States in the Arctic and Alaska. Could Donald Trump, who himself harbors ambitions for Greenland, facilitate the Russian president’s agenda in the region?
MIKHAIL KOMIN: In any case, that’s exactly what Putin is counting on: to take advantage of Donald Trump’s Arctic ambitions. If Russia and the United States were to develop "joint projects", this would certainly mean, in simple terms, that Russia would invest in some American infrastructure in the Arctic, and the United States would invest in Russian infrastructure. This would require the United States to lift some of the sanctions imposed on Moscow.
To achieve this, Putin could offer Trump a lucrative deal in the region to divide the spheres of influence between the two powers. In my opinion, this would be extremely harmful for Canada, but especially for Europe, which would then find itself excluded from the great geopolitical game being played in this region.
And even if the negotiations with Donald Trump on Ukraine were to fail completely, this would not put an end to potential joint projects. Given Putin's views on the Arctic and those of Donald Trump, the next point of European military confrontation could be precisely this region.
L'EXPRESS: And not Central or Eastern Europe?
MIKHAIL KOMIN: Don't get me wrong: I'm not saying that Vladimir Putin's Russia will necessarily start military operations in the Arctic. But if a conflict breaks out between Russia and NATO in the coming years, it will most likely happen in this region. Precisely because Vladimir Putin’s main priority after Ukraine is to control part of the Arctic, not Europe.
Thus, the territory where the main confrontation will unfold will undoubtedly be near the Barents or Baltic Seas, and not, as is sometimes assumed, in the Suwalki Corridor in Poland or Moldova.
In a sense, if such an operation were to take place, it would follow a logic similar to that which led Putin to invade Ukraine. The Kremlin believed that a fully pro-Western Ukraine, likely to join the EU and NATO, posed a strategic threat to Russia, so much so that it first tried, in 2013-2014, to change its political course by force, and then, in 2022, through the large-scale invasion that we have witnessed over the past three years.
This scenario of "preventive" Russia's attack to maintain its advantage over the West could be repeated in the Arctic, but this time to secure its strategic assets, and in particular nuclear ones, in the High North.
L'EXPRESS: What can Europe do about the course Russia is taking?
MIKHAIL KOMIN: It is clear that over the last ten to fifteen years the European agenda in the Arctic has focused mainly on environmental and scientific issues, as well as on indigenous peoples. But I fear that this era is over and that Europe must now prioritize its military agenda in this sensitive new geopolitical zone. The problem is that the Old Continent has a history of establishing military cooperation with the United States, which seems to have been compromised under the Trump administration, especially because of the US president's interest in Greenland.
Therefore, to counter the imperialist ambitions of Russia and the United States in the region, European countries should focus primarily on developing military cooperation that does not involve the United States. This could apply, for example, to India, which is also beginning to show interest in this region, but also to Canada.
In any case, Europe should at least demonstrate more independent ambitions in the region, and not be content with those based on the United States, in particular by strengthening the NORDEFCO format (ed. note: a cooperation program between Finland, Sweden, Norway, Denmark and Iceland, created in 2009). It would also be useful to allocate part of the recently approved budgets for European rearmament to strengthen the fleet in the Barents and North Seas.
L'EXPRESS: To support his strategy in the Far North, Putin is counting on China in particular. But according to a confidential Russian intelligence document leaked to the "New York Times" in June, the Kremlin is increasingly suspicious of Beijing. Could this hinder Russia's ambitions in the Arctic?
MIKHAIL KOMIN: The question is complicated. On the one hand, Russia has become highly dependent on China since Western sanctions: Beijing buys a lot of resources from Russia, which helps Vladimir Putin continue his war against Ukraine. The problem is that in return, China is trying to impose some of its priorities on Russia. Among them is an increased presence in the Arctic.
Moscow and Beijing have signed several memorandums emphasizing the importance of this region in their relations and expressing their ambition to make certain investments there. But the Kremlin is extremely wary of China's presence and ambitions in the Arctic, especially with regard to the Northern Sea Route (NSR).
Russia considers the Northern Sea Route to be a "national" trade artery and has established de facto control over the entire territory, preventing access to it by international players. For the Kremlin, the Northern Sea Route is primarily a security tool.
For its part, China, which declared itself a "near Arctic state" in its White Paper, proposes that this route be considered an "international" trade route, freely accessible to all countries. Beijing would like the Northern Sea Route to become part of its "One Belt, One Road" initiative.
All this greatly irritates the Kremlin, as does China's active construction of its own fleet of icebreakers. If Russia does not allow China into Arctic waters and the Northern Sea Route, China will have nowhere to use these ships.
Therefore, the issue of Sino-Russian relations in the region remains relatively uncertain. Let’s just say that China and Russia are united by the fact that they are authoritarian regimes that get along well on some issues and compete on others. For now, the latter aspect seems to prevail and has somewhat frozen cooperation between the two countries in the Arctic.
But the longer Russia’s war in Ukraine continues, the more dependent it will become on China, which could ultimately lead Beijing to put pressure on Moscow on Arctic issues and gain greater access to the region, thus changing the geopolitics of the region.