Poor, sad, corrupt, gray... Clichés about the countries of the former communist bloc die hard. For Arthur Königsberg, co-founder of the Euro Creative think tank and specialist in the region, one expression embodies the persistence of these prejudices in the French collective consciousness: "Eastern Europe".
In his book "Eastern Europe Does Not Exist", the researcher calls on us to get rid of this term, an "artificial creation" of Joseph Stalin, which denies the Western character of the countries of the region and indirectly serves the strategic interests of the Kremlin. "Nothing has changed since Stalin's time; "this region is still considered a buffer between the West and Russia," Arthur Königsberg says regretfully in an interview with the French newspaper L'Express, preferring to speak of "Central and Eastern Europe."
This misunderstanding, he says, explains the missteps of French diplomacy towards these countries and our blindness to the true nature of Vladimir Putin's regime, right up to the invasion of Ukraine.
L'EXPRESS: You find the term "Eastern Europe" problematic. Why?
ARTHUR KONIGSBERG: Because it was artificially created by Stalin. After World War I, this entire part of Europe, between the Baltic and the Black Sea, was made up of new or reborn states liberated from the empires that had occupied them. As early as the 1920s, debates arose about what to call this region. Some speak of "Central Europe", others of "Middle Europe", or even "Mitteleuropa", but never of "Eastern Europe".
The term did not exist because these nations were recognized as a full part of Europe. It was Joseph Stalin, when he took control of these countries after World War II, who effectively imposed a division between Western and Eastern Europe. From then on, two models emerged: Western Europe, liberal, democratic, and capitalist; and the other Europe, communist, Soviet, and collectivist. But before that, Eastern Europe simply did not exist.
This distinction was supposed to disappear with the collapse of the communist bloc, because during the Cold War, the expression "Eastern Europe" denoted a space and a model opposed to the West. From 1989-1991 onwards, and especially with the enlargement of Europe in 2004 and 2007, these countries clearly integrated into the Western bloc. By continuing to speak of Eastern Europe, we deny the Western and European identity of these countries. Even at that time, the writer Milan Kundera spoke of the "abducted West".
L" EXPRESS: In France, our collective consciousness is still permeated by the term "Eastern Europe", isn't it?
ARTHUR KOENIGSBERG: Of course, one only has to follow the French public debate. Every time these countries are mentioned, we talk about "Eastern Europe" as if it were a homogeneous whole, when in fact they are very different countries. This leads to countless stereotypes and caricatures. Until February 24, 2022.
France was completely ignorant of the geography of this part of the continent. Many political, diplomatic and military leaders could not even correctly locate these countries on a map. In France, looking east meant looking at Germany, and then immediately at Russia. Everything in between was practically ignored. I am always amazed by the reaction of those who discover these countries for the first time.
When a French person visits Warsaw, Prague, Kiev or Tallinn, he almost always experiences the same astonishment: "But this is Europe, it is modern, just like home!" This testifies to the persistence of certain clichés about these countries, which are perceived as backward, gray and marked by communism... although some of them, on the contrary, are very modern and have achieved remarkable economic progress.
L" EXPRESS: You write that this term serves Vladimir Putin's strategic interests. Why?
ARTHUR KOENIGSBERG: Recognizing the existence of Eastern Europe in a sense means recognizing the existence of Russia's "natural" sphere of influence. That is exactly what Stalin wanted: to create a buffer between the West and the Soviet Union. Strategically, this buffer was supposed to be in direct contact with the Western bloc in order to protect Russia in the event of a military conflict.
To talk about Eastern Europe today is in a sense to admit that Vladimir Putin is right when he says that this is a region in which he has a say. Russians actually like to call the former Soviet territories their "near abroad". But to accept this interpretation implicitly means to accept that Russia can have a say when a country in the region considers whether to join NATO. It means to recognize a sphere of strategic influence that supposedly replaces the sovereignty and complete freedom of the countries in the region.
In the end, nothing has changed since Stalin's time; this region is still perceived as a buffer between the West and Russia. And in France, the majority of our political leaders, diplomats and military have refused to see this continuity between the USSR and the Putin regime, the similarities between Putin's rhetoric and that of Stalin. And all this despite the warnings issued by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, whose elites, who clearly saw the path that Russia was taking and the narrative that it was starting to impose, were constantly sounding the alarm.
It is important to remember that these societies have experienced Russian occupation. They know better than anyone what the return of imperialist rhetoric and strategic or security-related demands on their territories means. But instead of listening to them, many preferred to accuse them of Russophobia, paranoia...
L" EXPRESS: You point the finger at France's mistakes, claiming that it has not developed its relations with Central and Eastern Europe sufficiently...
ARTHUR KÖNIGSBERG: Since the early 1990s, French diplomacy has made a series of mistakes and missteps with regard to Central and Eastern Europe. It all started with François Mitterrand, who, despite his initial intuition, understood that the countries newly liberated from communism would want to join the European Community and that these countries should not be kept in some kind of stagnation for too long.
Hence his idea of a "European Confederation", whose stated aim was to anchor these countries to Europe until the necessary reforms were implemented. His mistake was to include the Soviet Union in this confederation, which in 1990 had not yet collapsed. Mitterrand wanted to reach out to Gorbachev, and I can understand his theoretical reasoning at the time. The problem was that it was unacceptable for the countries liberated from communism to find themselves in a political system that included Moscow.
The second big mistake was made by Jacques Chirac. In my opinion, it is far more serious because it is incomprehensible, both from a political and diplomatic point of view. In 2003, these countries did not support France's position on the American invasion of Iraq. Chirac, visibly irritated, publicly declared that these countries had "missed the opportunity to remain silent" and that their attitude was "ill-mannered". We must understand the message sent to these countries, barely freed from a totalitarian system, which see Europe as a family, synonymous with freedom and freedom of speech. This is a terrible signal.
In the book I cite other mistakes, each of which reveals a certain contempt on the part of a part of the French political and diplomatic class for these countries. One cannot imagine for a moment a French leader using such harsh words towards Germany, Great Britain, Russia... This gave the impression of an arrogant France that respects only a few great powers and that feels its superiority over all the other "small countries".
L'EXPRESS: You also criticize the "incomprehensible rapprochement between France and Russia" initiated by Emmanuel Macron at the beginning of his first term...
ARTHUR KÖNIGSBERG: It all started in 2017 with a grand reception organized by Emmanuel Macron for Vladimir Putin in the sumptuous setting of the Palace of Versailles. This rapprochement strategy was a difficult mistake to justify, because by that time it was no longer possible to ignore Russia's position. Its imperialism had been evident since 2008 with the invasion of Georgia, which was stripped of part of its territory, and then in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and the partial occupation of Donbas.
In 2017, just a few years after these events, Putin had not yet calmed down. On the contrary, his imperialist rhetoric had intensified. At that time, all of Europe had its eyes on the "new France" of Emmanuel Macron, which was strongly pro-European. However, one of the first diplomatic initiatives during his five-year term was the attempt to build an "security and confidence architecture" with Russia. The word "trust" is a real problem for Russia's neighbors.
From their point of view, and quite rightly so, trust in a regime like the Kremlin's - dictatorial, mafia-like and controlled by the secret services - is impossible. However, before the invasion of Ukraine, such statements were considered activism and Russophobia in Paris, since a significant part of the French elite continued to adhere to the myth of historical Franco-Russian friendship.
L" EXPRESS: How can such a misunderstanding be explained? Were there no competent researchers and experts capable of clarifying the situation for decision-makers on this issue?
ARTHUR KOENIGSBERG: There have always been different points of view. Before February 24, 2022, those who warned about the nature of the Russian regime were hardly listened to by the Elysee Palace and part of the Quai d'Orsay (the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs). They were even perceived quite negatively. In one of his important speeches, Emmanuel Macron went so far as to speak of a "deep state", referring to those in the Quai d'Orsay who resisted this Franco-Russian rapprochement.
For a long time, Hélène Carrère d'Ancos was the leading authority on Russia and was often consulted by the French political elite. Unfortunately, she belonged to a certain school of thought whose intellectual worldview prevented her from grasping the true nature of the Kremlin regime and believed that the blame for Putin's re-invasion of Ukraine lay primarily with the West.
Those who raised concerns about Vladimir Putin's ambitions were sometimes labeled "Russophobes". We were criticized for being too close to the Poles and the Baltics, accused of paranoia and irrationality. I myself experienced this firsthand. Fortunately, since February 2022, due to circumstances, this is no longer the case.
L" EXPRESS: Does the withdrawal of the Americans from the conflict in Ukraine represent an opportunity for the Europeans to take greater responsibility in the region?
ARTHUR KOENIGSBERG: This is a double-edged sword. The Europeans have little time to prepare and gain independence from the United States. This requires building a much more effective industrial, technological and defense base. The problem is that Donald Trump embodies the quintessential negotiating player. According to him, American presence and defense depend on the purchase of American weapons and equipment.
In other words, if the countries of Central and Eastern Europe choose to arm themselves more with European equipment, they could fear a reaction from Washington that would read something like this: "Okay, do without us."
These countries fear such a scenario, especially since they wonder whether Europeans are ready to stand up to Russia. Are they united enough? And above all, the big taboo question: would France send its soldiers to fight for Tallinn if Russia attacked Estonia tomorrow?
That is why the leaders of these countries refuse to take this risk. In their eyes, American guarantees remain the most reliable.